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Brian Key

12 papers in the library · 138 citations · publishing 2015-2026

Papers

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Phenomenal consciousness in insects? A possible way forward

Animal Sentience August 3, 2026 Brian Key

Klein & Barron (2016) propose that subjective experience in humans arises in the midbrain and then argue that insects have the capacity for subjective experience because their nervous system can perform neural processing similar to that of the midbrain. This approach ultimately fails because it is built on the false premise that the midbrain is the source of the awareness of sensory stimuli. I...

Minds, morality and midgies

Animal Sentience August 3, 2026 Brian Key, Deborah J Brown

Mikhalevich & Powell argue that the exclusion of the vast majority of arthropods from moral standing is unwarranted, particularly given the purported evidence for cognition and sentience in these organisms. The implied association between consciousness and moral standing is questionable and their assumption that rich forms of cognition and flexible behavior are dependent on phenomenal...

DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1619 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Evolution Cognitive neuroscience Zoology Life sciences

The sensory horizons hypothesis fails to explain consciousness because it relies on an abstruse causal function.

Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 25, 2026 Brian Key

The sensory horizons hypothesis as an explanation of consciousness depends on visual experience directly affecting neural activity underlying conscious model-based planning. Given that there is no known mechanism for subjective experience to generate action potentials, the sensory horizons hypothesis lacks explanatory insight into the function of consciousness. We contend that a better strategy...

How pain fools everyone: An inference to the best explanation.

Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews October 1, 2025 Brian Key, Deborah J Brown 1 citation

There is a commonly held assumption that feelings such as pain are causes of behaviour. We say we withdrew our hand from the hotplate because it hurt or that we flinched at the needle because it stung. The causal role of pain is widely implicated in theories of learning and decision-making. But what if this commonsense idea that feelings cause behaviour is just wrong? To date, there is no known...

Making sense of feelings.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2024 Brian Key, Deborah J Brown 6 citations

Internal feeling states such as pain, hunger, and thirst are widely assumed to be drivers of behaviours essential for homeostasis and animal survival. Call this the 'causal assumption'. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the causal assumption is incompatible with the standard view of motor action in neuroscience. While there is a well-known explanatory gap between neural activity and...

DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae034 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Awareness Neural circuitry Phenomenal consciousness Qualia +1

What if worms were sentient? Insights into subjective experience from the Caenorhabditis elegans connectome

Biology & Philosophy August 23, 2023 Oressia Zalucki, Deborah Jean Brown, Brian Key 7 citations

Abstract Deciphering the neural basis of subjective experience remains one of the great challenges in the natural sciences. The structural complexity and the limitations around invasive experimental manipulations of the human brain have impeded progress towards this goal. While animals cannot directly report first-person subjective experiences, their ability to exhibit flexible behaviours such...

Foundations of Human and Animal Sensory Awareness: Descartes and Willis

Reading Descartes 2023 Deborah J Brown, Brian Key

In arguing against the likelihood of consciousness in non-human animals, Descartes advances a slippery slope argument that if thought were attributed to any one animal, it would have to be attributed to all, which is absurd. This paper examines the foundations of Thomas Willis’ comparative neuroanatomy against the background of Descartes’ slippery slope argument against animal consciousness....

A First Principles Approach to Subjective Experience.

Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 2022 Brian Key, Oressia Zalucki, Deborah J Brown 9 citations

Understanding the neural bases of subjective experience remains one of the great challenges of the natural sciences. Higher-order theories of consciousness are typically defended by assessments of neural activity in higher cortical regions during perception, often with disregard to the nature of the neural computations that these regions execute. We have sought to refocus the problem toward...

DOI: 10.3389/fnsys.2022.756224 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Awareness Feelings Phenomenal consciousness Qualia +1

Neural Design Principles for Subjective Experience: Implications for Insects.

Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience 2021 Brian Key, Oressia Zalucki, Deborah J Brown

How subjective experience is realized in nervous systems remains one of the great challenges in the natural sciences. An answer to this question should resolve debate about which animals are capable of subjective experience. We contend that subjective experience of sensory stimuli is dependent on the brain's awareness of its internal neural processing of these stimuli. This premise is supported...

Descartes’ Dualism of Mind and Body in the Development of Psychological Thought

July 30, 2020 Deborah J Brown, Brian Key

Few practitioners or researchers in psychology would think of the 17th-century French philosopher, René Descartes, as the founding father of their discipline. Yet, it is difficult to see how psychology could have emerged as a discipline in its own right without the contributions of Descartes. Descartes’ theoretical and experimental contributions to our understanding of rationality,...

Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc.

Frontiers in Physiology 2018 Brian Key, Deborah J Brown

There is compelling evidence that the "what it feels like" subjective experience of sensory stimuli arises in the cerebral cortex in both humans as well as mammalian experimental animal models. Humans are alone in their ability to verbally communicate their experience of the external environment. In other species, sensory awareness is extrapolated on the basis of behavioral indicators. For...

Fish do not feel pain and its implications for understanding phenomenal consciousness.

Biology & Philosophy 2015 Brian Key 115 citations

Phenomenal consciousness or the subjective experience of feeling sensory stimuli is fundamental to human existence. Because of the ubiquity of their subjective experiences, humans seem to readily accept the anthropomorphic extension of these mental states to other animals. Humans will typically extrapolate feelings of pain to animals if they respond physiologically and behaviourally to noxious...

DOI: 10.1007/s10539-014-9469-4 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Affective states Avoidance learning Fish Neocortex +3