Consciousness and the unity of mind
Animal Sentience August 3, 2026 DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1167 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Evolution Cognitive neuroscience Zoology Cognition and perception Life sciences |
| Key points | Argues that the seven objections raised against his account of animal personhood—including that the issue is insignificant, that personhood is socially constructed, and that his Lockean and implicit-self-awareness approach is flawed—can be answered, and that the remaining objections rest on misunderstandings. |
Abstract
Several types of objection have been raised against the arguments I presented in my target article, “Are animals persons?” Among the objections are the following: (1) the claim that animals are persons is of little significance, (2) my use of the Lockean conception of the person is questionable, (3) whether a creature qualifies as a person is a matter of social construction rather than objective fact, (4) reflective consciousness is more important than I realize, (5) my reliance on implicit self-awareness in the account of personhood is ill-advised, (6) my account entails that too many creatures qualify as persons, and (7) types of objection that resist categorization (but I shall argue are sundry misunderstandings). I respond to these objections.