6 papers in the library · 4 citations · publishing 2010-2026
Animal Sentience August 3, 2026 Mark Rowlands
Several types of objection have been raised against the arguments I presented in my target article, “Are animals persons?” Among the objections are the following: (1) the claim that animals are persons is of little significance, (2) my use of the Lockean conception of the person is questionable, (3) whether a creature qualifies as a person is a matter of social construction rather than...
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020 Mark Rowlands 2 citations
The question of whether consciousness is embodied has been vitiated by a failure to ask a more basic, and possibly obvious, question: what is the body? This chapter argues that the body you see in the mirror, the hands that you hold up in front of you, are instances of the body as object. But the body is more than the body as object. There is also the body as subject; the body as lived. You...
The MIT Press eBooks August 13, 2010 Mark Rowlands
This chapter examines the flaws of the thesis of the amalgamated mind and explains that, although the combining theses for the amalgamated mind are both sound when approached individually, they are mutually incompatible and cannot be combined without encountering problems. “The amalgamated mind” is a combination of the theses of the embodied mind and the extended mind. In tackling the...
August 13, 2010 Mark Rowlands
An investigation into the conceptual foundations of a new way of thinking about the mind that does not locate all cognition "in the head." There is a new way of thinking about the mind that does not locate mental processes exclusively "in the head." Some think that this expanded conception of the mind will be the basis of a new science of the mind. In this book, leading philosopher Mark...
The MIT Press eBooks May 21, 2010 Mark Rowlands 2 citations
IntroductionIn this chapter, I argue for an extended account of states that are both conscious and intentional (i.e., experiences but not sensations).1 The argument turns on two claims: (a) the intentional directedness of experiences consists in a form of revealing or disclosing activity, and (b) disclosing activity typically straddles neural processes, bodily processes, and things we do in and...
Social Brain, Distributed Mind April 29, 2010 Mark Rowlands
According to the thesis of the extended mind, at least some cognitive processes extend into the cognizing subject's environment in the sense that they are composed of processes of manipulation, exploitation, and transformation performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. In contrast, according to the thesis of the embedded mind, the manipulation, exploitation, and...