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Todd E Feinberg

9 papers in the library · 127 citations · publishing 2005-2026

Papers

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Multiple insights into affective sentience

Animal Sentience October 12, 2026 Jon Mallatt, Todd E Feinberg

We discuss some of the many valuable insights into affective sentience from Birch’s The Edge of Sentience, such as its eight criteria for determining which entities have sentience (e.g., emotions) and its insights into the difficulty of testing whether an Artificial Intelligence system has attained sentience. We add our own perspectives on why the eight criteria are valid, on the difficulty of...

Sentience, emergence in neurobiological systems, and the prospects for artificial consciousness

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2026 Todd E Feinberg, Jon Mallatt

Abstract In this commentary, we focus on three interrelated issues of particular importance for determining the possibility of “artificial consciousness”: 1) the distinctions between sentience and consciousness, 2) why the physical substrate of a complex system is critical for the emergence of sentience, and 3) how Emergence in Systems Theory helps explain consciousness in animals and whether...

Multiple Routes to Animal Consciousness: Constrained Multiple Realizability Rather Than Modest Identity Theory.

Frontiers in Psychology September 24, 2021 Jon Mallatt, Todd E Feinberg

The multiple realizability thesis (MRT) is an important philosophical and psychological concept. It says any mental state can be constructed by multiple realizability (MR), meaning in many distinct ways from different physical parts. The goal of our study is to find if the MRT applies to the mental state of consciousness among animals. Many things have been written about MRT but the ones most...

DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.732336 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Animal consciousness Convergent evolution Evolutionary constraints Mental phenomena +4

Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap.

Frontiers in Psychology 2020 Todd E Feinberg, Jon Mallatt 80 citations

The role of emergence in the creation of consciousness has been debated for over a century, but it remains unresolved. In particular there is controversy over the claim that a "strong" or radical form of emergence is required to explain phenomenal consciousness. In this paper we use some ideas of complex system theory to trace the emergent features of life and then of complex brains through...

DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01041 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Animal consciousness Complex systems Evolution Explanatory gap +4

Subjectivity "Demystified": Neurobiology, Evolution, and the Explanatory Gap.

Frontiers in Psychology 2019 Todd E Feinberg, Jon Mallatt 47 citations

While life in general can be explained by the mechanisms of physics, chemistry, and biology, to many scientists and philosophers, it appears that when it comes to explaining consciousness, there is what the philosopher Joseph Levine called an "explanatory gap" between the physical brain and subjective experiences. Here, we deduce the living and neural features behind primary consciousness...

DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01686 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Evolution Explanatory gap Neurobiology Phenomenal consciousness +2

The Ancient Origins of Consciousness

March 25, 2016 Todd E Feinberg, Jon Mallatt

How consciousness appeared much earlier in evolutionary history than is commonly assumed, and why all vertebrates and perhaps even some invertebrates are conscious. How is consciousness created? When did it first appear on Earth, and how did it evolve? What constitutes consciousness, and which animals can be said to be sentient? In this book, Todd Feinberg and Jon Mallatt draw on recent...

The evolutionary and genetic origins of consciousness in the Cambrian Period over 500 million years ago.

Frontiers in Psychology October 4, 2013 Todd E Feinberg, Jon Mallatt

Vertebrates evolved in the Cambrian Period before 520 million years ago, but we do not know when or how consciousness arose in the history of the vertebrate brain. Here we propose multiple levels of isomorphic or somatotopic neural representations as an objective marker for sensory consciousness. All extant vertebrates have these, so we deduce that consciousness extends back to the group's...

DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00667 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Lamprey Qualia Isomorphic/somatotopic neural representations Sensory images +2

Neuroontology, neurobiological naturalism, and consciousness: a challenge to scientific reduction and a solution.

Physics of Life Reviews March 2012 Todd E Feinberg

One of the great challenges to a science of consciousness is the inability to reduce critical features of consciousness to neural processes. In this paper I identify four neuroontologically irreducible features (NOIF) - referral of neural states, mental unity, qualia, and mental causation - defined as aspects of consciousness in which subjective experience is not wholly reducible to objectively...

Where in the brain is the self?

Consciousness and Cognition December 2005 Todd E Feinberg, Julian Paul Keenan

Localizing the self in the brain has been the goal of consciousness research for centuries. Recently, there has been an increase in attention to the localization of the self. Here we present data from patients suffering from a loss of self in an attempt to understand the neural correlates of consciousness. Focusing on delusional misidentification syndrome (DMS), we find that frontal regions, as...