Minds, morality and midgies
Animal Sentience August 3, 2026 DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1619 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Evolution Cognitive neuroscience Zoology Life sciences |
| Key points | Argues that the implied association between consciousness and moral standing is questionable and that the assumption that rich cognition and flexible behavior depend on phenomenal consciousness needs reconsideration in light of neuroscientific evidence. Proposes a neural algorithmic approach for deciphering whether organisms are capable of subjective experience. |
Abstract
Mikhalevich & Powell argue that the exclusion of the vast majority of arthropods from moral standing is unwarranted, particularly given the purported evidence for cognition and sentience in these organisms. The implied association between consciousness and moral standing is questionable and their assumption that rich forms of cognition and flexible behavior are dependent on phenomenal consciousness needs to be reconsidered in light of current neuroscientific evidence. We conclude by proposing a neural algorithmic approach for deciphering whether organisms are capable of subjective experience.