Still wondering how flesh can feel
Animal Sentience August 3, 2026 DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1185 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Evolution Cognitive neuroscience Zoology Cognition and perception Life sciences |
| Key points | Argues that Reber's claim of sentience as inherent in biological forms rests on unexamined assumptions about continuity and gradual accretion of mental faculties, which are not empirically justified. The author contends that highlighting species differences undermines Reber's thesis, and the hard problem remains unresolved. |
Abstract
Reber believes he has simplified Chalmers’s “hard problem” of consciousness by arguing that subjectivity is an inherent feature of biological forms. His argument rests on the related notions of continuity of mind and gradual accretion of capacities across evolutionary time. These notions need to be defended, not just asserted. Because Reber minimizes the differences in mental faculties among species across evolutionary time, it becomes easier to assert, and perhaps believe, that sentience is already present in early biological forms. The more explicit we are about the differences among these mental faculties and the differences across species, the less persuasive is Reber’s claim of the mental unity of species. The further claim that mental faculties develop gradually across evolutionary time is not empirically justified. How sentience can be “inherent” in biological forms is still not an “easy problem.”