Consciousness operationalized, a debate realigned.
Peter Carruthers, Bénédicte Veillet
Consciousness and Cognition October 1, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2017.07.008 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe paper revisits the debate about cognitive phenomenology, elaborating and defending a proposal that the test for irreducible phenomenology is the presence of explanatory gaps. It argues that the debate should be aligned between non-conceptual and conceptual or propositional phenomenology, rather than between sensory and cognitive phenomenology. The authors defend three varieties of non-sensory, non-conceptual phenomenology: valence, a sense of approximate number, and a sense of elapsed time.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Access consciousness Amodal experience Cognitive phenomenology Phenomenal consciousness |
| Citations | 43 |
| Key finding | Argues that the debate over cognitive phenomenology should be realigned as a distinction between non-conceptual and alleged conceptual or propositional phenomenology, and defends three varieties of non-sensory non-conceptual phenomenology. |
Abstract
This paper revisits the debate about cognitive phenomenology. It elaborates, defends, and improves on our earlier proposal for resolving that debate, according to which the test for irreducible phenomenology is the presence of explanatory gaps. After showing how proposals like ours have been misunderstood or misused by others, we deploy our operationalization to argue that the correct way to align the debate over cognitive phenomenology is not between sensory and (alleged) cognitive phenomenology, but rather between non-conceptual and (alleged) conceptual or propositional phenomenology. In doing so we defend three varieties of non-sensory (amodal)1 non-conceptual phenomenology: valence, a sense of approximate number, and a sense of elapsed time.