Phenomenal Consciousness
Cambridge University Press eBooks September 28, 2000 DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511487491 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 414 |
| Key points | Argues that phenomenal consciousness is fully explicable in naturalistic terms through a higher-order thought account. |
Abstract
How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic (scientifically acceptable) terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and defends a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. He shows that this can explain away some of the more extravagant claims made about phenomenal consciousness, while substantively explaining the key subjectivity of our experience. Written with characteristic clarity and directness, and surveying a wide range of extant theories, this book is essential reading for all those within philosophy and psychology interested in the problem of consciousness.
Citations in the library
Cited by 107
- Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 2007
- The search for invertebrate consciousness. Noûs March 1, 2022
- Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument Canadian Journal of Philosophy March 1, 2003
- ATTENTION AND MENTAL PAINT 1 Philosophical Issues October 1, 2010
- The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood. Frontiers in Psychology 2018
and 102 more in the library