Consciousness and Cognition
September 1, 2021
Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup, Peter Fazekas
5 citations
A new inference to the best explanation (IBE) process is proposed for comparing theories of consciousness based on empirical support. The process has four steps: Assimilate, Compile, Validate, and Compare. Most work so far has focused on assimilation. To demonstrate feasibility, the authors compile a complete collection of empirical evidence for the distinction between access consciousness (A-Consciousness) and phenomenal consciousness (P-Consciousness) and the overflow hypothesis. They also validate the interpretation of aphantasics' performance on retro-cue paradigms, which has been used to support the overflow hypothesis. This compilation is the first step toward enabling side-by-side comparisons of theories and the empirical phenomena they explain.
Front Psychol
September 23, 2025
Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup, Andreas Stephens, Aron Balogh Sjöstrand et al.
4 citations
The authors examine methodological challenges in consciousness research, focusing on how theories are compared, the role of empirical evidence, and a replication crisis. They argue that current approaches often lack rigorous theory comparison and that empirical evidence is sometimes insufficiently linked to theoretical predictions. The replication crisis further undermines confidence in findings. The paper calls for improved methods to ensure more reliable progress in understanding consciousness.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2022
Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup
3 citations
Misrepresentation, as proposed by some higher-order theories of consciousness, is plausible because conscious states are generated by brain processes that can be corrupted. Drawing on cognitive and behavioral neuroscience, brain state corruption is both possible and relatively frequent, and such corruption may occasionally lead to misrepresentation. The main alternative view, the no-consciousness reply, appears less supported by current knowledge. This meta-level argument rests on a general premise acceptable to most participants in the debate, distinguishing it from other empirically based arguments.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
January 1, 2026
Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup, Elizabeth Ann Stoll
A central obstacle to explaining consciousness is uncertainty about what kind of thing it is—its ontological status. Naturalization requires making every agreed property of consciousness continuous with properties admitted by the natural sciences. The hard problem will remain hard until cortical computation and the mechanisms by which biophysical processes generate phenomenal content are fully understood. This paper evaluates the naturalization project in light of debates in consciousness studies, then introduces a neuro-physically grounded framework for probabilistic neural computation: the holography solution. It offers a concrete account of naturalization, provides explanatory power, and identifies several testable predictions. Even if unconvincing, the proposal demonstrates that naturalization is possible and challenges other theories to deliver alternative accounts of what consciousness is.
Communications Psychology
November 26, 2025
Morten Overgaard, Peter Fazekas, Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup et al.
The field of consciousness research lacks consensus due to reliance on competing grand theories. A more productive path forward would shift focus toward construct-based, data-driven, and iterative approaches that identify empirical building blocks of conscious experience, enabling cumulative and integrative progress.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
September 24, 2025
Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup, S. Fink, Morten Overgaard
In the study of consciousness, multiple competing hypotheses about the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) are usually treated as mutually exclusive, with the expectation that only one will ultimately be correct. This paper proposes an alternative view: each hypothesis and its associated evidence may be simultaneously valid. The authors develop the multiple generator hypothesis (MGH), which distinguishes between principles—ways consciousness can be brought about—and generators—how these principles are implemented in physical systems. The MGH is explicated and illustrated with examples from consciousness studies, and its implications are shown to raise novel questions and considerations for the field.
Consciousness and Cognition
September 1, 2024
Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup, Jakob Stenseke, Morten Overgaard
The Conscious Turing Machine (CTM) model, proposed by Manuel and Lenore Blum, aims to define consciousness, address the hard problem of consciousness, and show the value of theoretical computer science for studying it. This evaluation examines CTM's explanatory power across philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, and computation. The authors conclude that claims of CTM constituting progress are currently premature, though the model has potential. Several avenues for future research are suggested to develop the model further.
Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift
December 12, 2023
Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup
The author challenges the widely held assumption that consciousness appears phenomenally unified to us. While most debates assume that consciousness seems unified and then ask whether it really is, this paper questions that starting point. The author argues that the way consciousness appears does not necessarily suggest it is unified. This objection undermines theories and arguments that rely on phenomenal unity as a premise. The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness is discussed as an example of a theory that is affected by this challenge.
Neuroimage
June 1, 2023
Joel Frohlich, Tim Bayne, Julia S Crone et al.
Consciousness likely cannot begin before the establishment of thalamocortical connectivity at 26 weeks gestation, as this system is necessary for subjective experience according to most theoretical frameworks. To determine when consciousness emerges after this point, the authors advocate developing a sensory perturbational complexity index (sPCI) using auditory, visual, or olfactory cortical perturbations—rather than electromagnetic ones—to estimate the perinatal brain's state of consciousness. Techniques such as fMRI, EEG, and MEG can be used in both newborn and fetal studies, with the womb offering a more controlled environment than the cradle for such investigations.
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
July 19, 2021
Morten Overgaard, Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup
Neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) are often used as evidence for or against competing conceptual theories of the mind, but this is an overestimation of what NCC findings can do. There is neither an isomorphism nor a homomorphism between the conceptual frameworks of these theories and the data obtained from neuroimaging. Consequently, neural activation profiles alone cannot distinguish between competing theories. Two approaches are suggested to address this issue.
July 26, 2020
M. Overgaard, J. Mogensen, Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup
Identifying neural correlates of consciousness (NCC)—brain activity patterns that accompany conscious experience—raises deeper theoretical questions about what consciousness is. This volume examines the implications of NCC findings for major theories of consciousness, including global workspace theory, higher-order thought theory, local recurrency theory, and REFCON models. It also considers how different conscious phenomena, such as dreaming and altered states, shape the search for NCC. The work argues that mapping correlations between brain and consciousness does not end inquiry but instead prompts further philosophical and theoretical reflection on the nature of consciousness itself.