2 papers in the library · publishing 2019
Human and Animal Minds November 28, 2019 Peter Carruthers
Global-workspace theory is the best-supported account of the functional and neural correlates of consciousness. The theory is backed by extensive findings in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, including experiments that track conscious contents in the brain. Critiques and counter-evidence are addressed, and the use of evidence from nonhuman animals is argued not to beg the question about consciousness.
Human and Animal Minds November 28, 2019 Peter Carruthers
Global-workspace theory can provide a complete, reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness. By globally broadcasting nonconceptual content, the theory enables higher-order thoughts about that content that lack conceptual connections to physical, functional, or representational facts. This makes zombies conceivable and creates an epistemic explanatory gap. However, those higher-order thoughts themselves can be fully explained naturalistically, so all facts about consciousness can be accounted for. The chapter defends the reality of the phenomenal concepts needed for this account and responds to a dilemma posed by David Chalmers.