Higher-order (HO) theories of consciousness hold that a mental state is conscious when it is appropriately represented by a ‘higher-order’ state, a state about another mental state. The higher-order perception (HOP) theory holds that HO representation is best modeled on perceptual processes, while the higher-order thought (HOT) theory holds that it is best modeled on thought. In addition, some...
Most materialist responses to the zombie argument against materialism take either a “type-A” or “type-B” approach: they either deny the conceivability of zombies or accept their conceivability while denying their possibility. However, a “type-Q” materialist approach, inspired by Quinean suspicions about a priority and modal entailment, rejects the sharp line between empirical and conceptual...
Ned Block argues that the higher order (HO) approach to explaining consciousness is ‘defunct’ because a prominent objection (the ‘misrepresentation objection’) exposes the view as ‘incoherent’. What’s more, a response to this objection that I’ve offered elsewhere (Weisberg 2010) fails because it ‘amounts to abusing the notion of what-it’s-like-ness’ (Block 2011: 427).1 In this response, I wish...
The idea that conscious states are about both the world and themselves is an old one, tracing its roots back to Brentano and perhaps even as far back as Aristotle. There is, according to this picture, an intrinsic reflexiveness at the heart of conscious experience. In his important and provocative book Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory, Uriah Kriegel approaches this...