Bootstrapping and Its Discontents in Consciousness Science

Abstract

This paper critically examines the methodological strategy of iterative bootstrapping within marker-based natural kind reasoning, with specific application to the science of consciousness. By drawing an explicit parallel to its use in the domain of computation, the analysis demonstrates that bootstrapping procedures—particularly under assumptions of theory-neutrality—fail to generalise operational markers across divergent substrates. The failure to formalise computation across architectures (e.g., Turing machines and neuromorphic systems) undermines efforts to demarcate computation simpliciter. This methodological circularity is shown to replicate in consciousness science, where markers calibrated on human neurocognitive architecture undergo conceptual drift when applied to non-human systems. The apparent convergence of such markers thus reflects internal consistency with the human baseline rather than cross-substrate generalisability, ultimately casting doubt on the capacity of bootstrapping to identify consciousness simpliciter in a principled, non-anthropocentric manner.