Cognition is defined as adaptive-autonomy in embodied and situated neurodynamics, where a web of stability dependencies between sensorimotor structures is created and preserved through historical or developmental processes. The authors argue that dynamicism has helped explain how cognitive agents work but has not addressed what makes something cognitive, and the former cannot be complete without the latter. They criticize behavioristic characterizations in favor of an organizational approach focused on internal dynamic relationships. Emotional embodiment plays a functional role: internal bioregulatory processes couple to the formation and adaptive regulation of neurodynamic autonomy. A minimally cognitive behavior program in evolutionary simulation modeling is discussed, suggesting a complementary minimally cognitive organization program is needed.
The concept of autonomy, central to the original enactivist proposal in "The Embodied Mind," is now neglected by many contemporary enactivists. Theories of autonomy fill a theoretical gap by providing a naturalized account of normativity and grounding a cognitive subject's identity in its organization. However, autonomy has often been assimilated into autopoiesis, and the foundational proposal shows a metaphysical tension between operational closure and sensorimotor dynamics, exemplified by the Bittorio model failing to satisfy conditions for sensorimotor constitution of experience. These problems can be solved by reconsidering autonomy at the sensorimotor neurodynamic level, using robotic simulations to illustrate strong sensorimotor dependency. The concept of habit is proposed as a building block, re-conceptualizing mental life as a habit ecology, with norms naturalized as dynamic, self-sustaining coherentism.
Digital platforms exploit the attention economy by using AI and data analytics to shape user engagement, creating cycles of attention capture and data extraction. Classical cognitivist and behaviorist theories fail to address harms to user autonomy and wellbeing. 4E approaches to cognitive science—emphasizing embodied, extended, enactive, and ecological cognition—provide a normative standpoint for understanding how digital environments actively constitute attentional patterns. Habit formation in digital contexts threatens personal autonomy by disaggregating habits into AI-managed behavioral patterns. A paradigm shift toward an ecology of attention is needed to foster environments that preserve human cognitive and social capacities against cognitive capitalism's exploitative tendencies.
The work argues that enactive robotics, which models how organisms interact with their environment through sensorimotor contingencies, can help understand how autonomous habits emerge beyond simple problem-solving frameworks. It proposes that the constraints imposed by sensorimotor contingencies shape the forms these habits take, leading to behaviors that are not merely goal-directed but arise from the dynamic interaction between agent and environment. This perspective challenges traditional cognitive science views that focus solely on internal representations and problem-solving, offering a broader account of autonomous agency and learning.