Scientific investigation of consciousness cannot begin from a theory-neutral foundation. Even approaches that claim to be theory-light rely on substantive background assumptions that cannot be set aside. The aspiration to minimize theory-dependence in favor of pure observation risks collapsing into naïve empiricism. There is no context-independent scientific method that can purge theoretical commitments from the neuroscience of consciousness without significant epistemic cost.
Two approaches to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics are compared: the Consciousness Collapses Wave Function (CCWF) model and the London-Bauer-French (LBF) phenomenological framework. The CCWF model provides a mathematically defined collapse mechanism yielding experimentally testable predictions about collapse, but these tests do not establish that consciousness causes collapse. Despite this limitation, CCWF offers conceptual clarity. The LBF approach lacks such clarity because it remains dependent on standard quantum formalism. Significant challenges have been raised against key features of CCWF, but further arguments are needed to undermine its claim of testability regarding consciousness collapsing the wave function.