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Karl Friston

48 papers in the library · 4,207 citations · publishing 1995-2026

Papers

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Integrated information and predictive processing theories of consciousness: An adversarial collaborative review.

Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews August 1, 2026 Andrew W. Corcoran, Andrew M. Haun, Reinder Dorman et al.

As neuroscientific theories of consciousness continue to proliferate, the need to assess their similarities and differences - as well as their predictive and explanatory power - becomes ever more pressing. Recently, a number of structured adversarial collaborations have been devised to test the competing predictions of several candidate theories of consciousness. In this review, we compare and...

Artificial Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle

July 31, 2026 Karl Friston

This chapter explores the theoretical intersection of artificial consciousness and the free energy principle, providing a rigorous physical framework for understanding sentience. It defines the “self” through the concept of Markov blankets and the process of self-evidencing, where autonomous systems minimise variational free energy to maintain their individuation from the environment. By...

The Complex Brain Hypothesis: Resolving the Entropy-Content Conundrum in Minimal Phenomenal Experience

arXiv (Cornell University) May 15, 2026 Jonas Mago, Edmundo Lopez-Sola, Jakub Vohryzek et al.

Minimal Phenomenal Experiences (MPEs) are states of consciousness in which wakefulness is preserved but phenomenal content is low or absent. The Entropic Brain Hypothesis (EBH) is a model of conscious processes that regards the entropy of spontaneous brain activity as a marker of 'phenomenal richness', exemplified by high-content psychedelic experiences (HCPEs). Yet recent human neuroimaging...

On the minimal theory of consciousness implicit in active inference.

Physics of Life Reviews March 1, 2026 Christopher J. Whyte, Andrew W. Corcoran, Jonathan Robinson et al. 5 citations

The multifaceted nature of subjective experience poses a challenge to the study of consciousness. Traditional neuroscientific approaches often concentrate on isolated facets, such as perceptual awareness or the global state of consciousness and construct a theory around the relevant empirical paradigms and findings. Theories of consciousness are, therefore, often difficult to compare; indeed,...

Protocol for investigating the warping of spatial experience across the blind spot to contrast predictions of the Integrated Information Theory and Predictive Processing accounts of consciousness.

PLoS One 2026 Clement Abbatecola, Bernard Marius ’t Hart, Belén M. Montabes De la Cruz et al.

We investigate the subjective experience of space around the visual blind spot area, the cortical representation of which is missing feedforward connectivity from one eye. We performed these experiments as part of an adversarial collaboration to test contrasting theories of consciousness; Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Predictive Processing Active Inference (AI), and Predictive Processing...

A Rosetta Stone hypothesis for neurophenomenology: mathematical predictions from predictive processing.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2026 Lancelot da Costa, Anil K. Seth, Karl Friston et al.

Consciousness science faces the challenge of bridging first-person experience with third-person empirical measurements. Neurophenomenology aims to build such 'generative passages' connecting the content of experience with behavioural and neuroscientific data. However, the mathematical machinery for such bridges remains underdeveloped. Here we develop a Rosetta Stone hypothesis from predictive...

The role of active inference in conscious awareness

PLoS One December 4, 2025 Jonathan Robinson, Andrew W. Corcoran, Christopher J. Whyte et al. 1 citation

Active inference, a first-principles framework for modelling the behaviour of sentient agents, is beginning to be applied in consciousness research. One hypothesis arising from the framework is that active inference is necessary for changes in conscious content. As one component of an extensive adversarial collaboration among competing theories of consciousness, active inference will be...

A beautiful loop: An active inference theory of consciousness.

Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews September 1, 2025 Ruben Laukkonen, Karl Friston, Shamil Chandaria 17 citations

Can active inference model consciousness? We offer three conditions implying that it can. The first condition is the simulation of a world model, which determines what can be known or acted upon; namely an epistemic field. The second is inferential competition to enter the world model. Only the inferences that coherently reduce long-term uncertainty win, evincing a selection for consciousness...

Pathfinding: a neurodynamical account of intuition.

Communications Biology August 13, 2025 Steven Kotler, Michael Mannino, Karl Friston et al. 2 citations

We examine the neurobiology of intuition, a term often inconsistently defined in scientific literature. While researchers generally agree that intuition represents "an experienced-based process resulting in a spontaneous tendency toward a hunch or hypothesis," we establish a firmer neurobiological foundation by framing intuition evolutionarily as a pathfinding mechanism emerging from the...

Cross-Frequency Coupling as a Neural Substrate for Prediction Error Evaluation: A Laminar Neural Mass Modeling Approach

bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) March 19, 2025 Giulio Ruffini, Edmundo Lopez-Sola, Raul P. Aristides et al. 8 citations preprint

Abstract Predictive coding frameworks suggest that neural computations rely on hierarchical error minimization, where sensory signals are evaluated against internal model predictions. However, the neural implementation of this inference process remains unclear. We propose that cross-frequency coupling (CFC) furnishes a fundamental mechanism for this form of inference. We first demonstrate that...

The paradox of the self-studying brain.

Physics of Life Reviews March 1, 2025 Simone Battaglia, Philippe Servajean, Karl Friston 14 citations

The paradox of a brain trying to study itself presents a conundrum, raising questions about self-reference, consciousness, psychiatric disorders, and the boundaries of scientific inquiry. By which means can this complex organ shift the focus of study towards itself? We aim at unpacking the intricacies of this paradox. Historically, this question has been raised by philosophers under different...

Flow and intuition: a systems neuroscience comparison

Neuroscience of Consciousness January 4, 2025 Steven Kotler, Darius Parvizi-Wayne, Michael Mannino et al.

Abstract This paper explores the relationship between intuition and flow from a neurodynamics perspective. Flow and intuition represent two cognitive phenomena rooted in nonconscious information processing; however, there are clear differences in both their phenomenal characteristics and, more broadly, their contribution to action and cognition. We propose, extrapolating from dual processing...

How do inner screens enable imaginative experience? Applying the free-energy principle directly to the study of conscious experience.

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2025 Chris Fields, Mahault Albarracin, Karl Friston et al. 6 citations

This paper examines the constraints that the free-energy principle (FEP) places on possible model of consciousness, particularly models of attentional control and imaginative experiences, including episodic memory and planning. We first rehearse the classical and quantum formulations of the FEP, focusing on their application to multi-component systems, in which only some components interact...

Testing the role of spontaneous activity in visuospatial perception with patterned optogenetics.

PLoS One 2025 Kengo Takahashi, Samuel Pontes Quero, Julien Fiorilli et al.

A major debate in the field of consciousness pertains to whether neuronal activity or rather the causal structure of neural circuits underlie the generation of conscious experience. The former position is held by theoretical accounts of consciousness based on the predictive processing framework (such as neurorepresentationalism and active inference), while the latter is posited by the...

A Rosetta Stone Hypothesis for Neurophenomenology: Mathematical Predictions from Predictive Processing

arXiv Preprint Archive September 30, 2024 Lancelot da Costa, Anil K. Seth, Karl Friston et al.

Consciousness science faces the challenge of bridging first-person experience with third-person empirical measurements. Neurophenomenology aims to build such `generative passages' connecting the content of experience with behavioural and neuroscientific data. However, the mathematical machinery for such bridges remains underdeveloped. Here we develop a Rosetta Stone hypothesis from predictive...

Forgetting ourselves in flow: an active inference account of flow states and how we experience ourselves within them

Frontiers in Psychology June 3, 2024 Darius Parvizi-Wayne, Lars Sandved-Smith, Riddhi J. Pitliya et al. 20 citations

Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill....

Philosophy of psychiatry: theoretical advances and clinical implications.

World psychiatry : official journal of the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) June 1, 2024 Dan J Stein, Kris Nielsen, Anna Hartford et al. 70 citations

Work at the intersection of philosophy and psychiatry has an extensive and influential history, and has received increased attention recently, with the emergence of professional associations and a growing literature. In this paper, we review key advances in work on philosophy and psychiatry, and their related clinical implications. First, in understanding and categorizing mental disorder, both...

Understanding visual hallucinations: A new synthesis.

Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews July 1, 2023 Daniel Collerton, James Barnes, Nico J Diederich et al. 80 citations

Despite decades of research, we do not definitively know how people sometimes see things that are not there. Eight models of complex visual hallucinations have been published since 2000, including Deafferentation, Reality Monitoring, Perception and Attention Deficit, Activation, Input, and Modulation, Hodological, Attentional Networks, Active Inference, and Thalamocortical Dysrhythmia Default...

Canalization and plasticity in psychopathology

Neuropharmacology December 27, 2022 Robin Carhart-Harris, Shamil Chandaria, David Erritzøe et al. 106 citations

This theoretical article revives a classical bridging construct, canalization, to describe a new model of a general factor of psychopathology. To achieve this, we have distinguished between two types of plasticity, an early one that we call 'TEMP' for 'Temperature or Entropy Mediated Plasticity', and another, we call 'canalization', which is close to Hebbian plasticity. These two forms of...

Neural Mechanisms and Psychology of Psychedelic Ego Dissolution

Pharmacological Reviews September 9, 2022 Devon Stoliker, Adeel Razi, Gary F. Egan et al. 83 citations

Neuroimaging studies of psychedelics have advanced our understanding of hierarchical brain organization and the mechanisms underlying their subjective and therapeutic effects. The primary mechanism of action of classic psychedelics is binding to serotonergic 5-HT2A receptors. Agonist activity at these receptors leads to neuromodulatory changes in synaptic efficacy that can have a profound...

Extended active inference: Constructing predictive cognition beyond skulls.

Mind & Language June 1, 2022 Axel Constant, Andy Clark, Michael D Kirchhoff et al.

Cognitive niche construction is the process whereby organisms create and maintain cause-effect models of their niche as guides for fitness influencing behavior. Extended mind theory claims that cognitive processes extend beyond the brain to include predictable states of the world. Active inference and predictive processing in cognitive science assume that organisms embody predictive (i.e.,...

I overthink—Therefore I am not: An active inference account of altered sense of self and agency in depersonalisation disorder

Consciousness and Cognition April 28, 2022 Anna Ciaunica, Anil K. Seth, Jakub Limanowski et al. 76 citations

This paper considers the phenomenology of depersonalisation disorder, in relation to predictive processing and its associated pathophysiology. To do this, we first establish a few mechanistic tenets of predictive processing that are necessary to talk about phenomenal transparency, mental action, and self as subject. We briefly review the important role of 'predicting precision' and how this...

From Generative Models to Generative Passages: A Computational Approach to (Neuro) Phenomenology.

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2022 Maxwell J D Ramstead, Anil K. Seth, Casper Hesp et al. 75 citations

This paper presents a version of neurophenomenology based on generative modelling techniques developed in computational neuroscience and biology. Our approach can be described as computational phenomenology because it applies methods originally developed in computational modelling to provide a formal model of the descriptions of lived experience in the phenomenological tradition of philosophy...

AI ethics in computational psychiatry: From the neuroscience of consciousness to the ethics of consciousness

Behavioural Brain Research December 1, 2021 Wanja Wiese, Karl Friston

Methods used in artificial intelligence (AI) overlap with methods used in computational psychiatry (CP). Hence, considerations from AI ethics are also relevant to ethical discussions of CP. Ethical issues include, among others, fairness and data ownership and protection. Apart from this, morally relevant issues also include potential transformative effects of applications of AI—for instance,...