As neuroscientific theories of consciousness continue to proliferate, the need to assess their similarities and differences - as well as their predictive and explanatory power - becomes ever more pressing. Recently, a number of structured adversarial collaborations have been devised to test the competing predictions of several candidate theories of consciousness. In this review, we compare and...
This chapter explores the theoretical intersection of artificial consciousness and the free energy principle, providing a rigorous physical framework for understanding sentience. It defines the “self” through the concept of Markov blankets and the process of self-evidencing, where autonomous systems minimise variational free energy to maintain their individuation from the environment. By...
Minimal Phenomenal Experiences (MPEs) are states of consciousness in which wakefulness is preserved but phenomenal content is low or absent. The Entropic Brain Hypothesis (EBH) is a model of conscious processes that regards the entropy of spontaneous brain activity as a marker of 'phenomenal richness', exemplified by high-content psychedelic experiences (HCPEs). Yet recent human neuroimaging...
We aim to investigate the spatial experience of patients with chronic scotomas caused by lesion to early visual cortex, including primary visual cortex (V1) and adjacent extrastriate visual areas. These experiments are conducted as part of an adversarial collaboration testing contrasting theories of consciousness: Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and two Predictive Processing accounts,...
The multifaceted nature of subjective experience poses a challenge to the study of consciousness. Traditional neuroscientific approaches often concentrate on isolated facets, such as perceptual awareness or the global state of consciousness and construct a theory around the relevant empirical paradigms and findings. Theories of consciousness are, therefore, often difficult to compare; indeed,...
PLoS One2026Clement Abbatecola, Bernard Marius ’t Hart, Belén M. Montabes De la Cruz et al.
We investigate the subjective experience of space around the visual blind spot area, the cortical representation of which is missing feedforward connectivity from one eye. We performed these experiments as part of an adversarial collaboration to test contrasting theories of consciousness; Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Predictive Processing Active Inference (AI), and Predictive Processing...
Consciousness science faces the challenge of bridging first-person experience with third-person empirical measurements. Neurophenomenology aims to build such 'generative passages' connecting the content of experience with behavioural and neuroscientific data. However, the mathematical machinery for such bridges remains underdeveloped. Here we develop a Rosetta Stone hypothesis from predictive...
This paper proposes a neurodynamic framework for meaningful experience, grounded in the recursive alignment of brain dynamics across time. We argue that the meaningful experiences known as "purpose", "synchronicity", and "flow" are not distinct phenomena, but temporal expressions of the same underlying process: metastable coherence in the brain's attractor landscape. Synchronicity marks...
Active inference, a first-principles framework for modelling the behaviour of sentient agents, is beginning to be applied in consciousness research. One hypothesis arising from the framework is that active inference is necessary for changes in conscious content. As one component of an extensive adversarial collaboration among competing theories of consciousness, active inference will be...
Can active inference model consciousness? We offer three conditions implying that it can. The first condition is the simulation of a world model, which determines what can be known or acted upon; namely an epistemic field. The second is inferential competition to enter the world model. Only the inferences that coherently reduce long-term uncertainty win, evincing a selection for consciousness...
We examine the neurobiology of intuition, a term often inconsistently defined in scientific literature. While researchers generally agree that intuition represents "an experienced-based process resulting in a spontaneous tendency toward a hunch or hypothesis," we establish a firmer neurobiological foundation by framing intuition evolutionarily as a pathfinding mechanism emerging from the...
The organization of consciousness is described through increasingly rich theoretical models. We review evidence that working memory capacity—essential to generating consciousness in the cerebral cortex—is supported by dual limbic memory systems. These dorsal (Papez) and ventral (Yakovlev) limbic networks provide the basis for mnemonic processing and prediction in the dorsal and ventral...
PsyArXivJuly 5, 2025Clement Abbatecola, Bernard Marius 'T Hart, Belen Maria Montabes de la Cruz et al.
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We investigate the subjective experience of space around the visual blind spot area, the cortical representation of which is missing feedforward connectivity from one eye. We performed these experiments as part of an adversarial collaboration to test contrasting theories of consciousness; Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Predictive Processing Active Inference (AI), and Predictive Processing...
Abstract Predictive coding frameworks suggest that neural computations rely on hierarchical error minimization, where sensory signals are evaluated against internal model predictions. However, the neural implementation of this inference process remains unclear. We propose that cross-frequency coupling (CFC) furnishes a fundamental mechanism for this form of inference. We first demonstrate that...
The paradox of a brain trying to study itself presents a conundrum, raising questions about self-reference, consciousness, psychiatric disorders, and the boundaries of scientific inquiry. By which means can this complex organ shift the focus of study towards itself? We aim at unpacking the intricacies of this paradox. Historically, this question has been raised by philosophers under different...
Abstract This paper explores the relationship between intuition and flow from a neurodynamics perspective. Flow and intuition represent two cognitive phenomena rooted in nonconscious information processing; however, there are clear differences in both their phenomenal characteristics and, more broadly, their contribution to action and cognition. We propose, extrapolating from dual processing...
This paper examines the constraints that the free-energy principle (FEP) places on possible model of consciousness, particularly models of attentional control and imaginative experiences, including episodic memory and planning. We first rehearse the classical and quantum formulations of the FEP, focusing on their application to multi-component systems, in which only some components interact...
PLoS One2025Kengo Takahashi, Samuel Pontes Quero, Julien Fiorilli et al.
A major debate in the field of consciousness pertains to whether neuronal activity or rather the causal structure of neural circuits underlie the generation of conscious experience. The former position is held by theoretical accounts of consciousness based on the predictive processing framework (such as neurorepresentationalism and active inference), while the latter is posited by the...
Consciousness science faces the challenge of bridging first-person experience with third-person empirical measurements. Neurophenomenology aims to build such `generative passages' connecting the content of experience with behavioural and neuroscientific data. However, the mathematical machinery for such bridges remains underdeveloped. Here we develop a Rosetta Stone hypothesis from predictive...
Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill....
Work at the intersection of philosophy and psychiatry has an extensive and influential history, and has received increased attention recently, with the emergence of professional associations and a growing literature. In this paper, we review key advances in work on philosophy and psychiatry, and their related clinical implications. First, in understanding and categorizing mental disorder, both...
This paper aims to assess whether the recently proposed "inner screen model" of consciousness that follows from the free-energy principle (FEP) can be regarded as a minimal unifying model (MUM) of consciousness, thereby providing a common foundational model for consciousness studies, and integrating approaches to consciousness based on the FEP. We first present the inner screen model, which...
Despite decades of research, we do not definitively know how people sometimes see things that are not there. Eight models of complex visual hallucinations have been published since 2000, including Deafferentation, Reality Monitoring, Perception and Attention Deficit, Activation, Input, and Modulation, Hodological, Attentional Networks, Active Inference, and Thalamocortical Dysrhythmia Default...
This paper presents a model of consciousness that follows directly from the free- energy principle (FEP). We first rehearse the classical and quantum formulations of the FEP. In particular, we consider the “inner screen hypothesis” that follows from the quantum information theoretic version of the FEP. We then review applications of the FEP to the known sparse (nested and hierarchical)...
This theoretical article revives a classical bridging construct, canalization, to describe a new model of a general factor of psychopathology. To achieve this, we have distinguished between two types of plasticity, an early one that we call 'TEMP' for 'Temperature or Entropy Mediated Plasticity', and another, we call 'canalization', which is close to Hebbian plasticity. These two forms of...