The Behavioral and brain sciences
May 30, 2019
Samuel P. L. Veissière, Axel Constant, Maxwell J D Ramstead et al.
362 citations
A unifying account of how humans acquire shared cultural habits, norms, and expectations is developed by integrating the variational free-energy principle from theoretical neuroscience with concepts of cultural evolution and implicit learning. Humans construct social niches that provide epistemic resources called cultural affordances. Through immersive participation in patterned cultural practices, agents learn by inferring what other people expect—a process termed "thinking through other minds" (TTOM). This makes information about others' expectations the primary statistical regularity humans use to predict and organize behavior. The model aims to resolve debates in cognitive science between internalist and externalist accounts of theory of mind and between dynamical and representational views of enactivism.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2021
Lars Sandved-Smith, Casper Hesp, Jérémie Mattout et al.
116 citations
Meta-awareness, the ability to notice the current content of consciousness, is crucial for controlling cognitive states like directing attention. This paper models meta-awareness and attentional control using hierarchical active inference, treating mental actions as policy choices over higher-level cognitive states. A further hierarchical level represents meta-awareness states that modulate the expected confidence in the mapping between observations and hidden cognitive states. Simulations of mind-wandering during a sustained selective attention task illustrate how this inferential architecture enables accessing and controlling cognitive states, offering a computational foundation for a phenomenology of mental action and self-monitoring.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
January 1, 2022
Maxwell J D Ramstead, Anil K. Seth, Casper Hesp et al.
75 citations
A version of neurophenomenology is presented that uses generative modelling techniques from computational neuroscience and biology to formally model descriptions of lived experience from the phenomenological tradition (e.g., Husserl, Merleau-Ponty). The approach, called computational phenomenology, is situated within the broader project of naturalizing phenomenology. Philosophical objections to that project are evaluated, and the generative modelling framework is reviewed. The approach differs from previous uses of generative modelling for consciousness by constructing computational models of inferential or interpretive processes that best explain particular kinds of lived experience.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2025
Chris Fields, Mahault Albarracin, Karl Friston et al.
6 citations
The free-energy principle (FEP) constrains possible models of consciousness, especially those of attentional control and imaginative experiences like episodic memory and planning. The paper first reviews classical and quantum formulations of the FEP, focusing on multi-component systems where only some parts interact directly with the environment. It discusses internal boundaries structured as Markov blankets, which act as classical information channels. The analysis shows how this framework supports models of attention and imagination, explaining how imaginative experience can use the same spatio-temporal and object-recognition frames as ordinary perception, and how it can be internally generated yet still surprising. The paper concludes with implications for implementation, phenomenology, phylogeny, and the large variability of imaginative experience in humans.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2026
Jonas Mago, George Deane, Lars Sandved-Smith et al.
People under the influence of psychedelics often report encountering autonomous entities such as spirits, elves, or ancestors. A neurocomputational model, grounded in the active inference framework, explains these experiences by proposing that psychedelics reduce the predictability of sensory perceptions, leading the brain to interpret both internal and external perceptions as coming from non-self agents. The model synthesizes earlier theories including the entropic brain model, computational accounts of felt presence, and sensory attenuation theories of self-other discrimination. It aims to account for how the brain supports entity encounters and for the diversity and similarity of these experiences across cultural contexts.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2026
Lancelot da Costa, Anil K. Seth, Karl Friston et al.
A Rosetta Stone hypothesis from predictive processing proposes that beliefs serve as a central hub linking phenomenology, behavior, and neural dynamics. Under the assumption that phenomenology is a function of beliefs, the authors derive mathematical predictions for subjective similarity judgments, cognitive metabolic cost, subjective cognitive effort, and time perception. They review the connection between beliefs and neural dynamics to complete a generative passage for neurophenomenology, omitting the belief–behavior link as already documented. Testing these predictions will inform the validity of the central assumption and advance the neurophenomenology research program.
arXiv Preprint Archive
September 30, 2024
Lancelot da Costa, Anil K. Seth, Karl Friston et al.
A Rosetta Stone hypothesis from predictive processing proposes that beliefs serve as a central hub linking phenomenology, behavior, and neural dynamics. If phenomenology is a function of beliefs, then specific predictions follow for subjective similarity judgments, cognitive metabolic cost, subjective cognitive effort, and time perception. The connection between beliefs and neural dynamics completes the generative passage for neurophenomenology, while the belief-behavior link is already well-documented. Testing these predictions will inform the validity of the central assumption and advance the neurophenomenology research program.