The Transcendental Argument for Universal Mineness: A Critique
Review of Philosophy and Psychology November 22, 2022 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-022-00658-6 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Argument complex analysis Consciousness Transcendental number Epistemology Argument map Metaphysics |
| Key points | Argues that the transcendental argument for universal mineness fails to substantiate an essential connection between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness. |
Abstract
Abstract The claim that phenomenal consciousness essentially involves self-consciousness, in the sense of mineness , has gained momentum in recent years. In this paper, I discuss the main non-phenomenological, theoretical argument for this claim: the so-called “transcendental argument” for universal mineness (Zahavi 2018, p. 711), which, in essence, corresponds to Shoemaker’s critique of the perceptual model of self-consciousness. I point out the potential of the transcendental argument, but most importantly its limitations. And I show that, even if successful, the argument cannot vindicate the claim of an essential connection between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness. Since the transcendental argument is depicted as the “central argument” for universal mineness (Zahavi 2018, p. 711), I contend that, in view of its failure, the claim that all of my experiences have to be given to me as mine , all of your experiences have to be given to you as yours , etc., appears insufficiently substantiated. The idea that there is an essential connection between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness must be called into question.