Intuition-Driven Navigation of the Hard Problem of Consciousness
Krzysztof Sękowski, Wiktor Rorot
Review of Philosophy and Psychology February 27, 2021 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-021-00533-w (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that the ontological and epistemological status of intuitions restricts arguments in the consciousness debate, and proposes a resolution through a “positive” kind of intuition, termed “The Canberrish Plan for Consciousness”. |
Abstract
The discussion of the nature of consciousness seems to have stalled, with the “hard problem of consciousness” in its center, well-defined camps of realists and eliminativists at two opposing poles, and little to none room for agreement between. Recent attempts to move this debate forward by shifting them to a meta-level have heavily relied on the notion of “intuition”, understood in a rather liberal way. Against this backdrop, the goal of this paper is twofold. First, we want to highlight how the ontological and epistemological status of intuitions restricts the arguments in the debate on consciousness that rely on them. Second, we want to demonstrate how the deadlock in those debates could be resolved through a study of a particular, “positive” kind of intuitions. We call this approach “The Canberrish Plan for Consciousness” as it adopts elements of the methodological “Canberra Plan”.