Editorial: Self-Consciousness Explained—Mapping the Field
Stefan Lang, Klaus Viertbauer
Review of Philosophy and Psychology June 1, 2022 DOI: 10.1007/s13164-022-00641-1 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 4 |
| Key points | The text presents pre-reflective self-consciousness as a subject's awareness of her ongoing experience, which Giustina and Kriegel characterize as "peripheral" self-consciousness: attention is mainly directed at external objects, events, and states of affairs, while the experience itself is only dimly conscious, a constant "humming in the background of our stream of consciousness." |
Abstract
Self-Consciousness ranks among the most urgent topics in today's Philosophy of Mind.In particular, one of the most challenging agenda is the explanation of prereflective self-consciousness. 1 According to philosophers like Anna Giustina and Uriah Kriegel pre-reflective self-consciousness consists in a subject's awareness of her ongoing experience. 2 It is a case of "peripheral" self-consciousness, i.e. while a subject's attention is mostly focused on the external objects, events, and states of affairs, the experience itself is much more dimly conscious.3 Pre-reflective self-consciousness is a constant "humming in the background of our stream of consciousness." 4 By consciousness Giustina and Kriegel mean phenomenal consciousness, i.e. conscious mental states, such as a conscious visual perception of a tomato, which have a conscious qualitative character.5 The conscious qualitative character is characterized, in Thomas Nagel's famous words, by "what it is like"1 Instead of the expression 'pre-reflective self-consciousness' the expressions 'inner awareness', 'subjective character', 'sense of self' and others are also used.For an overview cf.
Citations in the library
Cited by 2
Cites 9
- Phenomenal Consciousness Cambridge University Press eBooks September 28, 2000
- Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument Canadian Journal of Philosophy March 1, 2003
- The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness Oxford University Press eBooks July 9, 2020
- Minimal phenomenal experience Philosophy and the Mind Sciences March 24, 2020
- I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2017
and 4 more in the library