Journal of Consciousness Studies
October 1, 2024
Michael Tye
This article argues that the best explanation for the absence of borderline cases with respect to phenomenal consciousness is that phenomenal consciousness is irreducible. This, I argue, leads to a paradox, which is best resolved by adopting a form of panpsychism. The version of panpsychism I elaborate explains differences in the phenomenal character of experiences via differences in what the...
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind
September 2, 2009
Michael Tye
Abstract This article surveys representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness as well as the major arguments for them. It also takes up two major objections. The article is divided into five sections. The first section offers some introductory remarks on phenomenal consciousness. The second section presents the classic view of phenomenal consciousness to which representationalists are...
The MIT Press eBooks
December 12, 2008
Michael Tye
139 citations
Four major puzzles of consciousness philosophical materialism must confront after rejecting the phenomenal concept strategy. We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? To defend materialism, philosophical materialists have formulated what is sometimes called "the...
The MIT Press eBooks
December 12, 2008
Michael Tye
1 citation
This chapter’s discussion puts to task the views developed in previous chapters in an attempt to solve four famous philosophical puzzles: the Puzzle of Mary, the Explanatory Gap, the Hard Problem of Consciousness, and the Possibility of Zombies. How is it possible for Mary, in the famous thought experiment, to make a discovery when she leaves her black-and-white room? In what form does the...
Noûs
September 1, 1996
Michael Tye
46 citations
To many philosophers, it is a remarkable fact there is any such thing as consciousness. Typically, this attitude stems from a sense of bewilderment as to how consciousness could be generated in the brain. But it is also hard to fathom why Mother Nature went to the trouble of installing consciousness in so many of her creatures. What was consciousness selected for? What biological purpose or...
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
September 1, 1996
Michael Tye
17 citations
David Papineau's book on naturalism is clear, level-headed, and illuminating. It is also very broad in its sweep. Papineau considers a variety of different challenges to the naturalist's position, and he tries to meet each of these challenges head-on. There is no waffling or obscurantism. My focus in this paper will be on some of the remarks Papineau makes with respect to consciousness. I am...
Philosophical Issues
1996
Michael Tye
44 citations
Like Bill Lycan, I am a strong representationalist about perceptual experience. I hold that the the phenomenal or 'what it is like' aspects of perceptual experiences (and indeed all experiences and feelings) can be understood in terms of their representational contents. Like Lycan, I believe that perceptual experience is layered. Like Lycan, I am not moved by any of the putative...
The MIT Press eBooks
November 17, 1995
Michael Tye
1,665 citations
Can neurophysiology ever reveal to us what it is like to smell a skunk or to experience pain? In what does the feeling of happiness consist? How is it that changes in the white and gray matter composing our brains generate subjective sensations and feelings? These are several of the questions that Michael Tye addresses, while formulating a new and enlightening theory about the phenomenal "what...
Noûs
June 1, 1994
Michael Tye
54 citations
L'A. developpe un argument d'ordre intentionnaliste contre l'application de la notion de qualia au domaine des experiences de la perception, et rejette a la fois la theorie du contenu de la perception et l'hypothese classique du spectre inverse dans un monde inverse
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
March 1, 1993
Michael Tye
9 citations
One standard objection to the view that phenomenal experience is functionally determined is based upon what has come to be called ‘The Absent Qualia Hypothesis’, the idea that there could be a person or a machine that was functionally exactly like us but that felt or consciously experienced nothing at all (see Block, 1980; Block and Fodor, 1980; Campbell, 1980; Nagel, 1980). Advocates of this...