Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind September 2, 2009 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0015 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness are supported by several major arguments, but faces two significant objections that are discussed in the final section. |
Abstract
Abstract This article surveys representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness as well as the major arguments for them. It also takes up two major objections. The article is divided into five sections. The first section offers some introductory remarks on phenomenal consciousness. The second section presents the classic view of phenomenal consciousness to which representationalists are opposed. The third section canvasses various versions of representationalism about consciousness. The fourth section lays out the main arguments for the representationalist stance. The final section addresses the two objections.