Philosophical Studies
September 26, 2023
Justin D’Ambrosio, Daniel Stoljar
24 citations
Abstract There is good reason to think that, in every case of perceptual consciousness, there is something of which we are conscious; but there is also good reason to think that, in some cases of perceptual consciousness—for instance, hallucinations—there is nothing of which we are conscious. This paper resolves this inconsistency—which we call the presentation problem—by (a) arguing that...
May 17, 2023
Daniel Stoljar
This chapter introduces the main issues, including in particular the ignorance hypothesis, the epistemic view, and non-standard physicalism more generally. Part I: What Consciousness Is: This section explains what consciousness in the phenomenal sense is (i.e., phenomenal consciousness) and how it relates to consciousness in other senses, that is, higher-order and access consciousness. Part II:...
Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind
December 23, 2021
Daniel Stoljar
This chapter argues that there is a fascinating tension between Armstrong’s perceptual or self-scanning model of introspection, and his account of the function of consciousness. The account of the function of consciousness is roughly that consciousness is necessary for purposive thought: in order to think things through, we must keep track of and be aware of our various thoughts. Thus,...
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness
July 9, 2020
Daniel Stoljar
According to the epistemic view of the hard problem of consciousness, we are ignorant at least for the time being of something important and relevant when it comes to the hard problem, and this fact has a significant implication for its solution. This chapter outlines one version of the view before considering two objections. The first is that, while we may be ignorant of various features of...
Ignorance and Imagination
July 1, 2006
Daniel Stoljar
Abstract This chapter discusses the idea that it is mistaken to suppose that there is a genuinely philosophical problem of experience at all. According to one version of the challenge, the problem should be rejected on methodological grounds: it is mistaken to reason from conceivability to possibility at all. It is argued that this reasoning is ubiquitous in philosophy, and thus to the extent...
Ignorance and Imagination
July 1, 2006
Daniel Stoljar
AbstractThe question “what is the problem of experience” can be divided into two: what is the topic of the problem of experience, and what problem or problems are we raising about the topic. In this chapter, the author identifies the topic: events of experience whose defining characteristic is that there is something it is like to undergo them. Conceiving of experiences this way leaves open...
July 1, 2006
Daniel Stoljar
AbstractThis book advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The correct response to the problem, it is argued, is not to posit a realm of experience distinct from the physical, nor to deny the reality of phenomenal experience, nor even to rethink our...