Qualia, Content, and the Inverted Spectrum
Noûs June 1, 1994 DOI: 10.2307/2216047 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 54 |
| Key points | Argues that an intentionalist framework undermines the application of qualia to perception and rejects both the content theory of perception and the classical inverted spectrum hypothesis in an inverted world. |
Abstract
L'A. developpe un argument d'ordre intentionnaliste contre l'application de la notion de qualia au domaine des experiences de la perception, et rejette a la fois la theorie du contenu de la perception et l'hypothese classique du spectre inverse dans un monde inverse
Citations in the library
Cited by 5
- Blindsight, the Absent Qualia Hypothesis, and the Mystery of Consciousness Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement March 1, 1993
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- Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc. Frontiers in Physiology 2018
- Consciousness and Object Advances in Consciousness Research October 19, 2017