ISSN 1533-6077
8 papers in the library · 829 citations · publishing 1995-2010
Philosophical Issues October 1, 2010 Ned Block 132 citations
Abstract Much of recent philosophy of perception is oriented towards accounting for the phenomenal character of perception—what it is like to perceive—in a non‐mentalistic way—that is, without appealing to mental objects or mental qualities. In opposition to such views, I claim that the phenomenal character of perception of a red round object cannot be explained by or reduced to direct...
Philosophical Issues 1996 Ned Block 434 citations
The greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind -maybe even all of philosophydivides two perspectives on consciousness. The two perspectives differ on whether there is anything in the phenomenal character of conscious experience that goes beyond the intentional, the cognitive and the functional. A convenient terminological handle on the dispute is whether there are qualia. Those who think that the...
Philosophical Issues 1996 Fred Dretske 140 citations
prominent citizens of the mind, and beliefs are individuated in terms of what they are beliefs about. I know of no plausible psychosemantics, no plausible theory of what makes one thing about another, that isn't externalist in character. It is the relations -causal, informational, historical, or whateverthat, on a given Sunday afternoon, makes something in my brain about football rather than...
Philosophical Issues 1996 Michael Tye 44 citations
Like Bill Lycan, I am a strong representationalist about perceptual experience. I hold that the the phenomenal or 'what it is like' aspects of perceptual experiences (and indeed all experiences and feelings) can be understood in terms of their representational contents. Like Lycan, I believe that perceptual experience is layered. Like Lycan, I am not moved by any of the putative...
Philosophical Issues 1996 Sydney Shoemaker 12 citations
Let me begin by indicating where I think Harman and I are in agreement. We both think that subjective reactions must come into an account of color, although we have different views about how they do. We both think that perceptual experience has a or representational character, and that is represented by our visual experiences as a feature of external objects, not as a feature of our experience....
Philosophical Issues 1996 Gilbert Harman 9 citations
Obviously we can become directly aware of intentional of certain intentional or representational features of our experiences, e.g. that given is visual of red tomato. Ned Block appears to believe that I deny this. He says, In Harman's lingo, representational feature of is feature of what is represented, not what is doing the representing. So let me insist that by a representational feature of...
Philosophical Issues 1996 Jaegwon Kim 5 citations
Fred Dretske is surely right when he says that most of those who accept content externalism believe, or simply assume, that qualia internal, or, if you prefer, the In fact, externalists apt to acknowledge that these the only purely internal residues of mentality. And if you a physicalist of any stripe, as most of us are, you would likely believe in the local supervenience of qualia -that is,...
Philosophical Issues 1995 Jaegwon Kim 53 citations
The problem of mental causation, broadly, is that of explaining how it is possible for mental events to enter into causal relations with other events, whether mental or physical. Somewhat more narrowly, it is the problem of explaining how it is possible for mental events to causally affect the (physical) behavior of physical systems. Although the problem was coeval with the mind-body problem...