How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Panpsychism

Phenomenal consciousness—what it is like to have an experience—has no borderline cases: an experience is either conscious or not. The best explanation for this absence of borderline cases is that phenomenal consciousness is irreducible to physical or functional properties. This leads to a paradox that is best resolved by adopting a form of panpsychism, the view that consciousness is a fundamental feature of reality. The version of panpsychism developed here explains differences in the phenomenal character of experiences via differences in what the experiences represent. This approach is compatible with representationalist claims about phenomenal consciousness and offers a straightforward solution to the problem of combination—how micro-level conscious experiences combine into macro-level conscious experiences.

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Abstract

This article argues that the best explanation for the absence of borderline cases with respect to phenomenal consciousness is that phenomenal consciousness is irreducible. This, I argue, leads to a paradox, which is best resolved by adopting a form of panpsychism. The version of panpsychism I elaborate explains differences in the phenomenal character of experiences via differences in what the experiences represent. This aspect of the current view is compatible with representationalist claims I have made in the past with respect to phenomenal consciousness. It also provides a straightforward and satisfying solution to the problem of combination.