7 papers in the library · 108 citations · publishing 2006-2026
Monism Matters August 13, 2026 Torin Alter
Abstract The relevant sort of monism is type monism, according to which all actual, concrete phenomena are such that there is exactly one unified, substantive, fundamental nature that they share. Considerations about monism help (i) motivate physicalism, idealism, and neutral monism; (ii) ground a traditional taxonomy in the philosophy of mind; (iii) explain core commitments of physicalism,...
The Matter of Consciousness March 2, 2023 Torin Alter
Abstract This chapter discusses the phenomenal concept strategy, which explains the epistemic gap in terms of special features of phenomenal concepts, rather than in terms of properties those concepts pick out. Chalmers argues that any such explanation of the epistemic gap either fails to explain our epistemic situation with respect to consciousness or cannot itself be explained in physical...
December 16, 2019 Torin Alter, Sam Coleman
Panpsychism has recently gained interest among analytic philosophers of mind. This is due largely to its close relationship with Russellian monism, according to which consciousness is constituted at least partly by intrinsic properties that serve as categorical grounds of dispositional properties posited by fundamental physics.1 On a leading version of this view, those intrinsic properties are...
Pacific philosophical quarterly March 1, 2010 Torin Alter 6 citations
Abstract Some argue that split‐brain cases undermine the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is necessarily unified. This paper defends the phenomenal unity thesis against Michael Tye's (2003 ) version of that argument. Two problems are identified. First, his argument relies on a questionable analysis of the split‐brain data. Second, his analysis leads to the view that in experimental...
Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge 2007 Torin Alter 52 citations
AbstractThe knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism — the view that the world is entirely physical. The argument first establishes the existence of facts (or truths or information) about consciousness that are not a priori deducible from the complete physical truth, and then infers the falsity of physicalism from this lack of deducibility. Frank Jackson gave the argument its classic...
2007 Torin Alter, Sven Walter 50 citations
Abstract What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This book discusses these topics. All chapters focus on consciousness in the “phenomenal” sense: looking at what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that the mind is physical. This controversy has gained focus...
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science January 15, 2006 Torin Alter
AbstractQualia are the subjective aspects, the characteristic properties, of conscious experience. There is extensive philosophical debate about how qualia relate to the physical world, and in what terms they can be characterized.