Consciousness raises philosophical questions about its relation to reality, its location, and its nature. The chapter focuses on how consciousness relates to other features of reality, a central question in recent philosophy. The difficulty arises from an alleged explanatory gap between consciousness and physical processes. The chapter examines the source of this gap and its philosophical implications.
Many scientists expect brain research to reveal the physical basis of conscious experience. However, Papineau contends that scientific investigation has limits when addressing the 'hard problem' of linking phenomenal concepts—our subjective experiences—to specific material states. Phenomenal concepts are inherently vague and do not point determinately to particular neural correlates. The chapter also examines Higher-Order Thought (HOT) and representational theories of consciousness, which offer alternative frameworks for understanding how mental states become conscious.
The author argues that existing theories of consciousness are fundamentally misguided because consciousness is not a standard scientific topic. Rather than building theories as if consciousness were analogous to electricity or chemical valency, researchers should first reflect on their methodology. Doing so reveals that theories of consciousness attempt to answer a question that does not actually exist.