Representationalism and Panpsychism
Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness July 8, 2021 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198867234.003.0005 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a qualified panpsychism should be accepted for "consciousness*", a key element of consciousness, while consciousness itself is inherently representational and evolved. The author proposes solutions to three problems facing this hybrid view: undirected consciousness, combination, and tiny psychological subjects, and also takes up the causal efficacy of consciousness. |
Abstract
Abstract: A solution is offered to the paradox presented in Chapter 1. This solution requires us to embrace a qualified form of panpsychism for consciousness, or rather for a key element of consciousness I call “consciousness*”. Consciousness, I claim, is inherently representational and did indeed evolve. This is not true for consciousness*. Three problems are discussed for the hybrid view I develop: the problem of undirected consciousness; the problem of combination; and the problem of tiny psychological subjects. Solutions are offered for each of these problems. The final section of the chapter takes up the question of the causal efficacy of consciousness.
Citations in the library
Cites 14
- Ten Problems of Consciousness The MIT Press eBooks November 17, 1995
- Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism Oxford University Press eBooks May 29, 2008
- Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help us Explain Consciousness Dialectica 2009
- Consciousness Revisited The MIT Press eBooks December 12, 2008
- Representationalism about Consciousness The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness July 9, 2020
and 9 more in the library