A Paradox of Consciousness
July 8, 2021 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198867234.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a paradox arises in thinking about phenomenal consciousness: considerations about how consciousness emerges in the physical world suggest it cannot be sharp (on/off), while attempts to describe borderline cases suggest it cannot be vague either, since such descriptions always locate the indeterminacy in what is experienced rather than in experience itself. |
Abstract
Abstract There are strong reasons to hold that phenomenal consciousness (experience) cannot be sharp (on/off) and equally strong reasons to hold that phenomenal consciousness cannot be vague (admitting borderline cases). In the former case, the reasons have to do with understanding the emergence of consciousness in the physical world. In the latter case, the reasons have to do with the fact that when we try to describe a borderline case of consciousness, we always end up describing a case in which there is indeterminacy in what is experienced as opposed to in experience or consciousness itself. A paradox thus arises in our thinking about consciousness. This chapter is devoted to laying out the paradox in detail.
Citations in the library
Cites 15
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Ten Problems of Consciousness The MIT Press eBooks November 17, 1995
- Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism Oxford University Press eBooks May 29, 2008
- Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help us Explain Consciousness Dialectica 2009
- Consciousness Revisited The MIT Press eBooks December 12, 2008
and 10 more in the library