Perceptual Experience Is a Many-Layered Thing
Philosophical Issues 1996 DOI: 10.2307/1522897 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 44 |
| Key points | Argues that while Lycan's representationalism about perceptual experience is broadly correct, Lycan's specific version places him under considerable strain due to internal tensions that require resolution; the reply aims to explain why Lycan's position needs smoothing out rather than to provide the fix itself. |
Abstract
Like Bill Lycan, I am a strong representationalist about perceptual experience. I hold that the the phenomenal or 'what it is like' aspects of perceptual experiences (and indeed all experiences and feelings) can be understood in terms of their representational contents. Like Lycan, I believe that perceptual experience is layered. Like Lycan, I am not moved by any of the putative counter-examples adduced by Chris Peacocke (in his 1983). And like Lycan, I have a book coming out shortly with MIT Press, defending the representational approach to qualia.1 (It too reads better when bought.) So, Lycan's heart, in my view, is unquestionably in the right place. I am less confident about the location of his other organs and limbs. Lycan's version of representationalism seems to me to place him under considerable strain. What he needs is a good massage (or a few days on the beach in Canciin) -something that will smooth out some of the tensions in his position. My primary aim in this reply is not to play the role of masseur but to explain why Lycan requires the services of one.