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Jaak Panksepp

4 papers in the library · 119 citations · publishing 2010-2016

Papers

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The cross-mammalian neurophenomenology of primal emotional affects: From animal feelings to human therapeutics.

The Journal of Comparative Neurology June 1, 2016 Jaak Panksepp 54 citations

The neural correlates of human emotions are easy to harvest. In contrast, the neural constitution of emotional feelings in humans has resisted systematic scientific analysis. This review summarizes how preclinical affective neuroscience initiatives are making progress in decoding the neural nature of such feelings in animal brains. This has been achieved by studying the rewarding and punishing...

The emergence of primary anoetic consciousness in episodic memory.

Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience January 3, 2014 Marie Vandekerckhove, Luis Carlo Bulnes, Jaak Panksepp 65 citations

Based on an interdisciplinary perspective, we discuss how primary-process, anoetic forms of consciousness emerge into higher forms of awareness such as knowledge-based episodic knowing and self-aware forms of higher-order consciousness like autonoetic awareness. Anoetic consciousness is defined as the rudimentary state of affective, homeostatic, and sensory-perceptual mental experiences. It can...

The “Id” Knows More than the “Ego” Admits: Neuropsychoanalytic and Primal Consciousness Perspectives on the Interface Between Affective and Cognitive Neuroscience

Brain Science April 17, 2012 M. Solms, J. Panksepp

It is commonly believed that consciousness is a higher brain function. Here we consider the likelihood, based on abundant neuroevolutionary data that lower brain affective phenomenal experiences provide the “energy” for the developmental construction of higher forms of cognitive consciousness. This view is concordant with many of the theoretical formulations of Sigmund Freud. In this...

Why depression feels bad

Advances in Consciousness Research October 28, 2010 Mark Solms, Jaak Panksepp

We believe that conscious mental phenomena (such as feelings) are not epiphenomenal to the workings of the brain. Feelings evolved for good biological reasons; they make specific, concrete contributions to brain functioning. Notwithstanding all the philosophical complexities, therefore, the non-conscious/conscious interactions that are the focus of this book are, in our view, causal...