Foundations of Human and Animal Sensory Awareness: Descartes and Willis
Reading Descartes 2023 DOI: 10.36253/979-12-215-0169-8.06 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Historical analysis Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Thomas Willis, drawing on Gassendi's corporeal soul, distinguished reflex from cognitively mediated neural circuitry, providing a non-arbitrary basis for differentiating animals with consciousness from those without, in response to Descartes' slippery slope argument. The paper contends this methodology retains currency for neuroscience today. |
Abstract
In arguing against the likelihood of consciousness in non-human animals, Descartes advances a slippery slope argument that if thought were attributed to any one animal, it would have to be attributed to all, which is absurd. This paper examines the foundations of Thomas Willis’ comparative neuroanatomy against the background of Descartes’ slippery slope argument against animal consciousness. Inspired by Gassendi’s ideas about the corporeal soul, Thomas Willis distinguished between neural circuitry responsible for reflex behaviour and that responsible for cognitively or consciously mediated behaviour. This afforded Willis a non-arbitrary basis for distinguishing between animals with thought and consciousness and those without, a methodology which retains currency for neuroscience today.