The sensory horizons hypothesis fails to explain consciousness because it relies on an abstruse causal function.
The Behavioral and brain sciences June 25, 2026 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x25102811 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the sensory horizons hypothesis lacks explanatory insight into the function of consciousness due to the absence of a mechanism for subjective experience to generate action potentials, and proposes investigating non-causal functions instead. |
Abstract
The sensory horizons hypothesis as an explanation of consciousness depends on visual experience directly affecting neural activity underlying conscious model-based planning. Given that there is no known mechanism for subjective experience to generate action potentials, the sensory horizons hypothesis lacks explanatory insight into the function of consciousness. We contend that a better strategy is to investigate non-causal functions of consciousness.