The merits of higher-order thought theories
Trans/Form/Ação January 1, 2018 DOI: 10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.04.p31 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThis paper explains David Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, reviews a major objection to it, and argues that the objection is ultimately ineffective. However, the author contends that the objection points to a reason to consider an alternative HOT theory. The author then presents their own version of HOT theory as a suitable alternative.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that a major objection to Rosenthal's HOT theory is ineffectual but motivates a different HOT theory, which the author proposes as an alternative. |
Abstract
Abstract Over many years and in many publications David Rosenthal has developed, defended and applied his justly well-known higher-order thought theory of consciousness.2 In this paper I explain the theory, then provide a brief history of a major objection to it. I suggest that this objection is ultimately ineffectual, but that behind it lies a reason to look beyond Rosenthal's theory to another sort of HOT theory. I then offer my own HOT theory as a suitable alternative, before concluding in a final section.