The merits of higher-order thought theories
Trans/Form/Ação 2018 DOI: 10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.04.p31 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a major objection to Rosenthal's HOT theory is ineffectual but motivates a different HOT theory, which the author proposes as an alternative. |
Abstract
Abstract Over many years and in many publications David Rosenthal has developed, defended and applied his justly well-known higher-order thought theory of consciousness.2 In this paper I explain the theory, then provide a brief history of a major objection to it. I suggest that this objection is ultimately ineffectual, but that behind it lies a reason to look beyond Rosenthal's theory to another sort of HOT theory. I then offer my own HOT theory as a suitable alternative, before concluding in a final section.
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