The Evolution of Nagel's Panpsychism
Mind and Matter July 20, 2024 DOI: 10.53765/mm2024.9 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThis philosophical paper examines Thomas Nagel's influential 1979 account of panpsychism, noting that his position appears to oscillate between panpsychism and neutral monism. To resolve this tension, the author proposes that both mental and physical properties should be understood as different dispositions grounded in a psychophysically neutral domain of nature. The argument engages with Nagel's views and offers a theoretical resolution to the apparent conflict between these two metaphysical positions.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Philosophy |
| Key finding | Proposes that the tension in Nagel's account between panpsychism and neutral monism can be resolved by viewing mental and physical properties as dispositions grounded in a psychophysically neutral domain. |
Abstract
In an influential article, Thomas Nagel (1979) was one of the first to address the doctrine of panpsychism after a long time of silence about it. The present paper focuses on Nagel's account in detail, and how it seems to oscillate between the apparently conflicting positions of panpsychism and neutral monism. To resolve the tension between them it is proposed to consider the mental and the physical as different dispositions, both grounded in a psychophysically neutral domain of nature.