Mind and Matter
June 30, 2026
J. Díaz-Boils, Naotsugu Tsuchiya, CM. Signorelli
A formal mathematical model, inspired by Husserl's phenomenology, represents structural aspects of conscious experiences as layers that can be experienced in potentiality or actuality. The model shows that comparison among phenomenal experiences is only partial: some experiences are comparable, such as those carrying different aspects in actuality and potentiality, while others are not, such as those with the same number but different aspects in actuality. These results imply that the evolution of consciousness involves diverse modes of experiencing rather than an absolute scale across species. The methodology also clarifies how conceptual assumptions constrain mathematical structure, and how that structure constrains interpretations of phenomenal experience, making formalization transparent.
Mind and Matter
June 30, 2026
Reza Maleeh, Shaghayegh Konjedi
Self-inquiry, the contemplative practice taught by Ramana Maharshi, can be understood as a form of self-aware open monitoring of mind wandering. Practitioners non-reactively observe spontaneous thoughts while repeatedly redirecting attention to the sense of being the experiencer, without fixing on any object. This provisional subject-object distinction helps loosen identification with self-narratives. As the practice deepens, the distinction dissolves, revealing the self as non-dual awareness—pre-reflective, intransitive, and free of subject-object structure. The authors propose this cognitive model to complement Maharshi's phenomenological description, drawing on findings from cognitive neuroscience and contemplative science.
Mind and Matter
June 30, 2026
D. Rickles
Human consciousness may have a hard limit on its ability to 'jump out of the system'—a capacity called jootsing that Douglas Hofstadter thought might be unique to minds and not replicable by AI. This paper argues that any theory aspiring to describe the totality of reality, including observers and their interactions, faces a Gödelian limitation that produces two conflicting stances: an eternal inflation of knowledge or closed loops. Drawing on a version of dual-aspect monism that decomposes a totality, the paper shows that these stances can be reconciled, and that this reconciliation reveals something special about consciousness.
Mind and Matter
January 1, 2026
J. Starrett
Radical Panpsychism provides a mathematical and philosophical framework for panpsychism that solves the combination problem by redefining experience in structural terms: experience is the dynamics by which entities model and respond to their environments and own organization. Each entity is a fuzzy subset with internal degrees of freedom that evolve in response to environmental influences. This internal response represents mentality on a continuum from minimal experience in simple systems to consciousness in complex organisms. By grounding mentality in structural responsiveness rather than irreducible phenomenological substance, the theory expands panpsychism's scope, potentially making broader claims about the ubiquity of psychism in nature than traditional models.
Mind and Matter
July 20, 2024
M. Masi
The standard argument against free will holds that if volition depended on physically indeterministic processes, actions would be random and lack control. Quantum indeterminacy is often dismissed as irrelevant to libertarian agent-causation theories because interfering with quantum probability distributions would violate those laws. This paper challenges that assumption, presenting a concrete example in which a hypothetical agent with access to the temporal ordering of events can predetermine the outcome of a process without altering its defining probability laws. This conclusion is then used as the basis for a libertarian panpsychist interpretive model.
Mind and Matter
July 20, 2024
Sam Coleman
This philosophical paper examines Thomas Nagel's influential 1979 account of panpsychism, noting that his position appears to oscillate between panpsychism and neutral monism. To resolve this tension, the author proposes that both mental and physical properties should be understood as different dispositions grounded in a psychophysically neutral domain of nature. The argument engages with Nagel's views and offers a theoretical resolution to the apparent conflict between these two metaphysical positions.