Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics
July 18, 2022
Philip Goff
AbstractThis chapter argues that wave function monism – a popular theory of the ontology of quantum mechanics – cannot be true, on the grounds that its truth is inconsistent with the reality of consciousness. According to wave function monism, fundamental physical reality consists of a complex-valued field in a high-dimensional space. Building on a specific analysis of the grounding...
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness
July 9, 2020
Philip Goff, Sam Coleman
4 citations
Russellian monism is a quite general approach to the problem of consciousness, which comes in a variety of forms depending on what is said about the categorical properties of basic physical entities. We can usefully distinguish between panpsychist and panprotopsychist forms. Panpsychist Russellian monists hold that the categorical properties of basic physical entities are experiential...
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
October 29, 2019
Philip Goff
Panpsychism is the view that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the natural world. In a standard form of the view, the fundamental constituents of the physical world – perhaps electrons and quarks – have incredibly basic forms of conscious experience, and the consciousness of a human or animal brain is derived from the consciousness of its most basic parts. The main...
Topoi
October 19, 2018
Philip Goff
9 citations
Revelation is roughly the thesis that we have introspective access to the essential nature of our conscious states. This thesis is appealed to in arguments against physicalism. Little attention has been given to the problem that Revelation is a source of pressure in the direction of epiphenomenalism, as introspection does not seem to reveal our conscious states as being essentially causal. I...
Oxford Scholarship Online
August 24, 2017
Philip Goff
This is the first of two chapters discussing the most notorious problem facing Russellian monism: the combination problem. This is actually a family of difficulties, each reflecting the challenge of how to make sense of everyday human and animal experience intelligibly arising from more fundamental conscious or protoconscious features of reality. Key challenges facing panpsychist and...
Oxford Scholarship Online
August 24, 2017
Philip Goff
This chapter explores and defends a form of cosmopsychism: the combination of panpsychism and priority monism (the latter being the view that there is only one fundamental individual). The crucial advantage of cosmopsychism is that it offers a solution to the Subject Irreducibility Problem, discussed in the last chapter. After developing the view in response to various challenges, an empirical...
Oxford Scholarship Online
August 24, 2017
Philip Goff
This chapter outlines a consciousness-based approach to metaphysics: analytic phenomenology. Chapter 5 argued that introspection reveals the essential nature of our conscious states. Analytic phenomenology builds on this, taking our introspective grasp of the nature of consciousness as a crucial source of data for metaphysical enquiry. This methodology is explored in relation to contemporary...
Consciousness and Cognition
June 1, 2012
Philip Goff
A zombie is a physical duplicates of a human being which lacks consciousness. A ghost is a phenomenal duplicate of a human being whose nature is exhausted by consciousness. Discussion of zombie arguments, that is anti-physicalist arguments which appeal to the conceivability of zombies, is familiar in the philosophy of mind literature, whilst ghostly arguments, that is, anti-physicalist...