Topoi
October 19, 2018
Philip Goff
9 citations
Revelation—the idea that introspection reveals the essential nature of conscious states—is often used to argue against physicalism. This paper highlights a neglected problem: introspection does not reveal conscious states as essentially causal, which pressures views toward epiphenomenalism. The author critiques Hedda Hassel Mørch’s 'phenomenal powers view' as an inadequate response and instead defends a version of the 'consciousness+' response, which accommodates the causal role of consciousness without requiring its essence to be revealed by introspection.
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness
July 9, 2020
Philip Goff, Sam Coleman
4 citations
Russellian monism is a broad philosophical approach to explaining consciousness, with two main variants: panpsychism and panprotopsychism. Panpsychist Russellian monism claims that the fundamental properties of basic physical entities are experiential, meaning consciousness is a basic feature of matter. Panprotopsychist Russellian monism instead holds that these fundamental properties are proto-experiential—not conscious themselves, but essential for producing consciousness. The chapter first examines panpsychist forms, then turns to panprotopsychist forms.
Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics
July 18, 2022
Philip Goff
Wave function monism, a theory that fundamental physical reality is a complex-valued field in a high-dimensional space, cannot be true because its truth is inconsistent with the reality of consciousness. The argument builds on an analysis of the grounding relationship, showing that wave function monism fails to account for ordinary physical objects, and this failure entails a failure to account for consciousness. The argument does not assume either a materialist or an anti-materialist view of consciousness.
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
October 29, 2019
Philip Goff
Panpsychism holds that consciousness is a fundamental, ubiquitous feature of the natural world, with basic particles like electrons having simple forms of experience from which human and animal consciousness derives. Its appeal is that it avoids problems of physicalism (explaining consciousness from purely physical processes) and dualism (explaining how a non-physical mind affects a physically closed world). Critics argue that constitutive panpsychism faces physicalism's challenges in building complex consciousness from basic parts, while emergentist panpsychism faces dualism's causal interaction problem. The author responds to these criticisms, arguing that panpsychism in either form is preferable to its rivals.
Oxford Scholarship Online
August 24, 2017
Philip Goff
A consciousness-based approach to metaphysics, analytic phenomenology, uses introspection as a key source of data for metaphysical inquiry. Building on the claim that introspection reveals the essential nature of conscious states, this methodology is applied to debates on composition and to a phenomenological argument for presentism. The author argues that the datum of consciousness is largely neglected in contemporary philosophy and that properly appreciating it could transform analytic metaphysics.
Oxford Scholarship Online
August 24, 2017
Philip Goff
A family of difficulties known as the combination problem challenges Russellian monism, which holds that consciousness is fundamental to reality. Panprotopsychism risks collapsing into noumenalism, the view that humans cannot understand matter's concrete nature. Panpsychism faces the subject-summing problem: how micro-level conscious subjects combine into macro-level ones. A solution to the subject-summing problem is proposed, and panpsychist forms of Russellian monism are argued to be preferable on grounds of simplicity and elegance.
Oxford Scholarship Online
August 24, 2017
Philip Goff
Cosmopsychism, a combination of panpsychism and priority monism, holds that the universe itself is a single fundamental conscious subject. This view solves the Subject Irreducibility Problem, which challenges other theories. An empirical argument against emergentism is presented; if sound, cosmopsychism becomes the only anti-emergentist position that resolves the problem. The chapter also addresses the 'incredulous stare'—the intuition that cosmopsychism is too implausible—arguing that this reaction stems from cultural biases, and that both cosmopsychism and physicalism are rooted in the same anti-emergentist motivations.
Consciousness and Cognition
June 1, 2012
Philip Goff
Zombies are physical duplicates of humans without consciousness, while ghosts are phenomenal duplicates whose nature is entirely conscious. Although zombie arguments against physicalism are well-known in philosophy of mind, ghostly arguments have been neglected. This paper argues that ghostly arguments hold several dialectical advantages over zombie arguments. It then explains how the conceivability of ghosts conflicts with two forms of a priori physicalism: analytic functionalism and the Australian physicalism of Armstrong and Lewis.