Panpsychism and Russellian Monism
December 16, 2019 DOI: 10.4324/9781315717708-20 (opens in new tab)
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AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that recent philosophical interest in panpsychism stems largely from its connection to Russellian monism, on which consciousness is constituted at least partly by intrinsic properties that serve as categorical grounds of dispositional properties posited by fundamental physics. On a leading version, these intrinsic properties are phenomenal, so panpsychism seems to follow. The authors contend that Russellian monism avoids drawbacks of traditional materialism and dualism. |
Abstract
Panpsychism has recently gained interest among analytic philosophers of mind. This is due largely to its close relationship with Russellian monism, according to which consciousness is constituted at least partly by intrinsic properties that serve as categorical grounds of dispositional properties posited by fundamental physics.1 On a leading version of this view, those intrinsic properties are phenomenal, that is, experiential: properties that constitute what it is like to have an experience. Panpsychism seems to follow. Interest in Russellian monism has therefore led to interest in panpsychism.2 But what explains the recent interest in Russellian monism? Part of the explanation runs as follows. Over the last half-century or so, discussions of consciousness in analytic philosophy have focused largely on materialism/physicalism (we use the terms interchangeably) and dualism. But traditional forms of these views have considerable drawbacks. Traditional materialist views either disregard or distort the distinctive features of consciousness, and traditional dualist views fail to integrate consciousness adequately into the natural, causal order. Russellian monism seems to avoid both