ISSN 0022-362X
9 papers in the library · 566 citations · publishing 1964-2019
The Journal of Philosophy 2019 Andy Clark
Recent work in cognitive and computational neuroscience depicts the human brain as a complex, multi-layer prediction engine. This family of models has had great success in accounting for a wide variety of phenomena involving perception, action, and attention. But despite their clear promise as accounts of the neurocomputational origins of perceptual experience, they have not yet been leveraged...
The Journal of Philosophy August 1, 2017 Joshua Shepherd 26 citations
I offer an account of the experience of acting that demonstrates how agentive aspects of experience associated with the execution of intentions are richly integrated with perceptual aspects associated with parts of action taking place in the publicly observable world. On the view I elucidate, the experience of acting is often both an engagement with the world and a type of intimate acquaintance...
The Journal of Philosophy 2011 Declan Smithies 68 citations
Perception enables us to think demonstrative thoughts about the world around us, but what must perception be like in order to play this role? Does perception enable demonstrative thought only if it is conscious? This paper examines three accounts of the role of consciousness in demonstrative thought, which agree that consciousness is essential for demonstrative thought, but disagree about why...
The Journal of Philosophy 2011 Frédérique De Vignemont 46 citations
The enactive approach aims at providing a unified account of perceptual experiences in terms of bodily activities. Most enactive arguments come from the analysis of visual experiences (Noë, 2004), but there is one domain of consciousness where the enactive theses seem to be less controversial, namely, bodily experiences. After drawing the agenda for an enactive view of tactile experiences, I...
The Journal of Philosophy 2011 Timothy Lane, Caleb Liang 24 citations
Sydney Shoemaker, developing an idea of Wittgenstein’s, argues that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. Although we might be liable to error when “I” (or its cognates) is used as an object, we are immune to error when “I” is used as a subject (as when one says, “I have a toothache”). Shoemaker claims that the relationship between “I” as-subject...
The Journal of Philosophy 2011 Sam Coleman 10 citations
On the basis of two argumentative examples plus their ‘parity principle’, Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue that mental states like beliefs can extend into the environment. I raise two problems for the argument. The first problem is that it is more difficult than Clark and Chalmers think to set up the Tetris example so that application of the parity principle might render it a case of...
The Journal of Philosophy 1994 Scott Sturgeon 91 citations
L'A. se penche sur le probleme des qualia, les proprietes phenomenales d'un individu qui font de ses experiences et perceptions, des faits purement subjectifs. Il tente d'en comprendre la nature, et montre que le dualisme âme-corps peut etre evite meme si l'on ne parvient pas a une comprehension des qualia
The Journal of Philosophy June 27, 1968 James M. Edie, Paul Ricoeur, Edward G. Ballard et al. 188 citations
Paul Ricoeur was one of the foremost interpreters and translators of Edmund Husserl's philosophy. These nine essays present Ricoeur's interpretation of the most important of Husserl's writings, with emphasis on his philosophy of consciousness rather than his work in logic. In Ricoeur's philosophy, phenomenology and existentialism came of age and these essays provide an introduction to the...
The Journal of Philosophy October 1, 1964 Huston Smith 113 citations
Until six months ago, if I picked up my phone in Cambridge area and dialed KISS-BIG a voice would answer, Ifif. These were coincidences: KISS-BIG simply happened to be letter equivalents of an arbitrarily assigned telephone number, while I.F.I.F. represented initials of an organization with improbable name of International Federation for Internal Freedom. But coincidences were apposite to point...