Leaving the House of Mirrors
June 11, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780197840283.003.0007 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Consciousness Perception Qualia Optical illusion Cognition Epistemology Cognitive psychology Cognitive science Illusory contours Object grammar |
| Key points | Argues that Meta-Cartesianism explains the illusion of phenomenal consciousness, including why it seems introspectively obvious and why it appears epistemically and ethically significant. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter shows how the view presented in the earlier chapter, Meta-Cartesianism, solves the illusion problem: it explains the illusion of phenomenal consciousness. One thing it notably does, which other views cannot do, is explain why phenomenal consciousness seems so introspectively obvious: why it seems to us that we are acquainted with our phenomenal experiences. Doing so, Meta-Cartesianism also satisfyingly explains our intuitions that phenomenal experiences are irreducible and undetectable. While this explanation first focuses on the illusion of sensory phenomenality, it can be extended to non-sensory phenomenality: we can explain our illusion of mnemic, imaginative, high-level perceptual and cognitive phenomenality, as well as valenced phenomenality. Finally, the view can also explain why phenomenal consciousness seems so epistemically and ethically significant.