Leaving the House of Mirrors

Meta-Cartesianism explains the illusion of phenomenal consciousness, including why it seems introspectively obvious that we are acquainted with our phenomenal experiences. The view accounts for intuitions that phenomenal experiences are irreducible and undetectable. It first addresses the illusion of sensory phenomenality and then extends to non-sensory phenomenality, explaining illusions of mnemic, imaginative, high-level perceptual and cognitive phenomenality, as well as valenced phenomenality. Finally, the view explains why phenomenal consciousness appears epistemically and ethically significant.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract This chapter shows how the view presented in the earlier chapter, Meta-Cartesianism, solves the illusion problem: it explains the illusion of phenomenal consciousness. One thing it notably does, which other views cannot do, is explain why phenomenal consciousness seems so introspectively obvious: why it seems to us that we are acquainted with our phenomenal experiences. Doing so, Meta-Cartesianism also satisfyingly explains our intuitions that phenomenal experiences are irreducible and undetectable. While this explanation first focuses on the illusion of sensory phenomenality, it can be extended to non-sensory phenomenality: we can explain our illusion of mnemic, imaginative, high-level perceptual and cognitive phenomenality, as well as valenced phenomenality. Finally, the view can also explain why phenomenal consciousness seems so epistemically and ethically significant.