Addressing Objections

This chapter defends illusionism—the view that phenomenal consciousness does not exist—against eight objections. It argues that illusionism is coherent, can explain how we represent phenomenal properties, and does not depend on a loaded definition of phenomenal consciousness, widely shared mystery intuitions, or conceptual commitments. The chapter also contends that illusionism is not obviously false and that strong illusionist formulations are not inferior to substantively equivalent weak illusionist or realist formulations.

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Abstract

Abstract This chapter defends illusionism against various objections. First, the objection that illusionism is incoherent, because phenomenal consciousness cannot seem to exist without existing. Second, the objection that illusionism cannot explain how we represent phenomenal properties. Third, the objection that illusionism is only attractive if we assume a loaded definition of “phenomenal consciousness.” Fourth, the objection that illusionism is only attractive if mystery intuitions are widely shared, but they are not. Fifth, the objection that illusionism is only attractive if mystery intuitions are conceptual, but they are not. Sixth, the objection that illusionism is only attractive if mystery intuitions correspond to ineliminable commitments of phenomenal concepts, but they do not. Seventh, the objection that illusionism, even if coherent and argumentatively supported, is obviously false. Eighth, the verbal objection that strong illusionist formulations are inferior to substantively equivalent weak illusionist (and realist) formulations.