Addressing Objections
June 11, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780197840283.003.0008 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Consciousness Experimental philosophy Agnosticism Epistemology |
| Key points | Argues that illusionism about phenomenal consciousness withstands eight common objections and is a coherent, defensible position. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter defends illusionism against various objections. First, the objection that illusionism is incoherent, because phenomenal consciousness cannot seem to exist without existing. Second, the objection that illusionism cannot explain how we represent phenomenal properties. Third, the objection that illusionism is only attractive if we assume a loaded definition of “phenomenal consciousness.” Fourth, the objection that illusionism is only attractive if mystery intuitions are widely shared, but they are not. Fifth, the objection that illusionism is only attractive if mystery intuitions are conceptual, but they are not. Sixth, the objection that illusionism is only attractive if mystery intuitions correspond to ineliminable commitments of phenomenal concepts, but they do not. Seventh, the objection that illusionism, even if coherent and argumentatively supported, is obviously false. Eighth, the verbal objection that strong illusionist formulations are inferior to substantively equivalent weak illusionist (and realist) formulations.