Arguing for Illusionism

Abstract

Abstract This chapter argues for the most controversial claim of illusionism: the eliminative claim, which states that phenomenal consciousness does not exist. It does so via two arguments working in tandem. First, the Argument from Mysteries: because phenomenal consciousness seems mysterious, and because it does not help us explain other (non-phenomenal) things, we should reject its existence if we have good reasons to discard putative direct data we have about its existence. Second, the Argument from Irrelevance, which belongs to the family of debunking arguments: because appeals to phenomenal consciousness seem irrelevant to explain our judgments about phenomenal consciousness, we have good reasons to discard putative direct data about the existence of phenomenal consciousness. Together, these two arguments support the view that we should reject the existence of phenomenal consciousness. The chapter also contrasts this argumentative strategy with other comparable arguments.