Approaching the House of Mirrors
June 11, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780197840283.003.0005 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Consciousness Extant taxon Optical illusion Cognition Epistemology Thought experiment Cognitive psychology Cognitive science |
| Key points | Argues that extant solutions to the illusion problem do not explain why phenomenal experiences seem introspectively obvious, and proposes the evidential approach as a potential solution. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter characterizes the illusion problem (the problem of explaining the illusion of phenomenal consciousness) and critically examines extant candidate solutions to it. First, it shows that solving the illusion problem is essential, and it details the problem’s explanandum and desired explanans. Then, it examines various views, focusing on those of Michael Graziano and Derk Pereboom (with discussions of the views of Daniel Dennett, Georges Rey, Nicholas Humphrey, Hakwan Lau, Wolfgang Schwarz, Andy Clark, etc.). It argues that these views do not solve the illusion problem. Notably, they do not explain why phenomenal experiences seem introspectively obvious. Therefore, they also do not solve the illusion meta-problem: they do not explain why the illusion of phenomenal consciousness is so hard to apprehend as such. Finally, the chapter describes the evidential approach, which focuses on the entanglement between phenomenal cognition and evidential cognition, and could solve the illusion problem.