Approaching the House of Mirrors

This chapter characterizes the illusion problem—explaining why there appears to be phenomenal consciousness—and critically examines candidate solutions. It argues that existing views, including those of Michael Graziano and Derk Pereboom, fail to explain why phenomenal experiences seem introspectively obvious, and therefore also fail to solve the illusion meta-problem: why the illusion is so hard to apprehend as such. The chapter describes the evidential approach, which focuses on the entanglement between phenomenal cognition and evidential cognition, as a potential solution.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract This chapter characterizes the illusion problem (the problem of explaining the illusion of phenomenal consciousness) and critically examines extant candidate solutions to it. First, it shows that solving the illusion problem is essential, and it details the problem’s explanandum and desired explanans. Then, it examines various views, focusing on those of Michael Graziano and Derk Pereboom (with discussions of the views of Daniel Dennett, Georges Rey, Nicholas Humphrey, Hakwan Lau, Wolfgang Schwarz, Andy Clark, etc.). It argues that these views do not solve the illusion problem. Notably, they do not explain why phenomenal experiences seem introspectively obvious. Therefore, they also do not solve the illusion meta-problem: they do not explain why the illusion of phenomenal consciousness is so hard to apprehend as such. Finally, the chapter describes the evidential approach, which focuses on the entanglement between phenomenal cognition and evidential cognition, and could solve the illusion problem.