Synthese
June 12, 2025
Maxim Gorbachev, Keith Frankish
The illusionist theory of consciousness denies the existence of the ‘phenomenal’ properties widely thought to render experience conscious. Central to the illusionist approach is what we call the distortion thesis — the claim that introspective mechanisms systematically misrepresent neural processes in a way that strongly inclines us to judge that they have phenomenal properties, creating the...
Voprosy Filosofii
August 1, 2024
Keith Frankish, Maxim Gorbachev
This is the second part of the article by Keith Frankish Quining Diet Qualia, which asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The “classic” conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down “diet” conception will. I...
Voprosy Filosofii
July 1, 2024
Maxim Gorbachev
One of the central questions for contemporary philosophy of mind can be considered to be the question of the status of what is commonly called phenomenal consciousness or qualia. Any theory of consciousness must offer an explanation of phenomenality, which poses hard problem for researchers. However, it is not hard to see that such a formulation of the problem may be biased toward theories that...
Voprosy Filosofii
July 1, 2024
Keith Frankish, Maxim Gorbachev
This is the first part of the article by Keith Frankish Quining Diet Qualia, which asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The “classic” conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down “diet” conception will. The...
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science
2024
Maxim Gorbachev
1 citation
A few years ago, an illusionist theory of consciousness appeared in the philosophy of consciousness. It makes an unexpected statement – there is actually no phenomenal consciousness, it is illusory. This illusion is created introspective distortion of physical processes in the brain, which seem to us to have special phenomenal properties. However, an equally strong form of physicalism in the...
Philosophy Journal of the Higher School of Economics
March 31, 2023
Maxim Gorbachev
1 citation
In the Margins of Philosophical Treatises: Frankish, K., ed. 2017. Illusionism: As a Theory of Consciousness. Luton, Bedfordshire: Andrews UK.
Voprosy Filosofii
2022
Maxim Gorbachev
The hard problem of consciousness, which consists in the need for a non-functional explanation of subjective experience as a possibility to have subjective experience at all, while focusing on attempts to give this explanation, often loses sight of consciousness itself and its phenomenality, the real way of existence of which is assumed as a given. Illusionism replaces the hard problem of...
Voprosy Filosofii
2022
Keith Frankish, Maxim Gorbachev
This is the second part of the article devoted to the approach to the problem of consciousness, which is called illusionism. Illusionism claims that phenomenal consciousness is illusory, because conscious experience is misrepresented as having phenomenal properties. Illusionism replaces the hard problem of consciousness with the problem of illusion. In this part, special attention is paid to...
Voprosy Filosofii
2022
Maxim Gorbachev
This is the first part of the article, which presents arguments in favour of an approach to consciousness, which is called illusionism. This is the view that phenomenal consciousness is illusory. According to illusionists, our sense that our conscious experiences are like something is a result of the fact that we systematically misrepresent them or their objects as having phenomenal...