4 papers in the library · 1 citation · publishing 2024-2025
Synthese June 12, 2025 Maxim Gorbachev, Keith Frankish
The illusionist theory of consciousness denies the existence of the ‘phenomenal’ properties widely thought to render experience conscious. Central to the illusionist approach is what we call the distortion thesis — the claim that introspective mechanisms systematically misrepresent neural processes in a way that strongly inclines us to judge that they have phenomenal properties, creating the...
Voprosy Filosofii August 1, 2024 Keith Frankish, Maxim Gorbachev
This is the second part of the article by Keith Frankish Quining Diet Qualia, which asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The “classic” conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down “diet” conception will. I...
Voprosy Filosofii July 1, 2024 Keith Frankish, Maxim Gorbachev
This is the first part of the article by Keith Frankish Quining Diet Qualia, which asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The “classic” conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down “diet” conception will. The...
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 2024 Maxim Gorbachev 1 citation
A few years ago, an illusionist theory of consciousness appeared in the philosophy of consciousness. It makes an unexpected statement – there is actually no phenomenal consciousness, it is illusory. This illusion is created introspective distortion of physical processes in the brain, which seem to us to have special phenomenal properties. However, an equally strong form of physicalism in the...