Illusionism About Phenomenal Consciousness
June 11, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780197840283.003.0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Argument complex analysis Illusion Qualia Rest music Epistemology Cognitive science Physicalism Artificial consciousness |
| Key points | Argues that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, though it appears to exist. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter presents illusionism about phenomenal consciousness. Illusionism consists of two claims. First, phenomenal consciousness does not exist (eliminative claim). Second, it seems to exist (appearance claim). The chapter provides a historical overview of illusionism and details its different versions, before zeroing in on the version that the rest of the book will defend. The chapter also clarifies illusionism, distinguishing between strong and weak illusionism, as well as between phenomenal consciousness and quasi-phenomenal consciousness, before describing the main challenges faced by illusionists. First, they must argue for their view; second, they must explain why the illusion of phenomenal consciousness arises and remains so strong. Finally, the chapter provides a brief argument for the appearance claim (the uncontroversial claim that phenomenal consciousness seems to exist), and lays the foundations for the argument in favor of the eliminative claim (the highly controversial claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist).