Consciousness and Cognition
June 1, 2012
Keith Frankish
47 citations
The paper argues that the concept of 'diet qualia'—a watered-down version of classic qualia that strips away their intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective properties—has no distinctive content. Classic qualia are traditionally understood as intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective features of experience. The author contends that once these properties are removed, nothing phenomenal remains to be explained. Therefore, if one rejects classic qualia realism, the only thing left to explain is our disposition to judge that experiences have classic qualia—what the author calls 'zero' qualia. The paper concludes that diet qualia should be abandoned, following Dennett's suggestion to 'quine' them.
Synthese
June 12, 2025
Maxim Gorbachev, Keith Frankish
The illusionist theory of consciousness denies that experience has phenomenal properties—the qualities that supposedly make it conscious. Central to this view is the distortion thesis: introspective mechanisms systematically misrepresent neural processes, creating the illusion of phenomenality. This article maps possible patterns of such distortion, proposing a classification scheme based on three dimensions: positiveness, conceptuality, and dispellability. Eight distinct distortion patterns are described, each a hypothesis about how the illusion arises. The authors offer tentative plausibility assessments but do not advocate a specific view, aiming instead to stimulate further theorizing and empirical research on introspective distortion.
Voprosy Filosofii
August 1, 2024
Keith Frankish, M. Gorbachev
The classic conception of qualia—as intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective features of experience—cannot serve as a neutral starting point for theories of phenomenal consciousness. A watered-down "diet" version of qualia is often assumed to fill this role, but the article argues that this diet notion has no distinctive content. Once qualia are stripped of intrinsicality, ineffability, and subjectivity, no phenomenal residue remains. Therefore, if classic qualia realism is rejected, what needs explaining are only "zero" qualia: dispositions to judge that experiences have classic qualia. Diet qualia should be abandoned.
Voprosy Filosofii
July 1, 2024
Keith Frankish, M. Gorbachev
The article argues that the watered-down "diet" conception of qualia—stripped of intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective properties—has no distinctive content and cannot serve as a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness. If classic qualia realism is rejected, there is no phenomenal residue left to explain; only "zero" qualia remain, which are dispositions to judge that experiences have classic qualia. The author concludes that diet qualia should be quined, or eliminated, as a useful concept.
Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society
July 1, 2021
Keith Frankish
The problem of consciousness arises when it is conceptualized in terms of phenomenal feel rather than psychological function. Panpsychism offers an elegant solution by taking this depsychologization seriously, but it also illustrates its perils. Beyond one dead end highlighted by Nagasawa, panpsychism consigns consciousness to a metaphysical limbo beyond science and lacking ethical and personal significance. The argument suggests retracing steps and questioning the depsychologized conception itself.
Keith Frankish
preprint
The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) has been accused of being pseudoscience. This article evaluates that accusation and argues it has merit, concluding that IIT is at best a metaphysical theory misrepresented as science. The author contends that while IIT's methodology is anomalous, this does not excuse it from scientific standards; instead, the theory fails to meet criteria for empirical science and is better understood as a philosophical or metaphysical proposal rather than a scientific one.