6 papers in the library · 47 citations · publishing 2012-2025
Synthese June 12, 2025 Maxim Gorbachev, Keith Frankish
The illusionist theory of consciousness denies the existence of the ‘phenomenal’ properties widely thought to render experience conscious. Central to the illusionist approach is what we call the distortion thesis — the claim that introspective mechanisms systematically misrepresent neural processes in a way that strongly inclines us to judge that they have phenomenal properties, creating the...
Voprosy Filosofii August 1, 2024 Keith Frankish, Maxim Gorbachev
This is the second part of the article by Keith Frankish Quining Diet Qualia, which asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The “classic” conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down “diet” conception will. I...
Voprosy Filosofii July 1, 2024 Keith Frankish, Maxim Gorbachev
This is the first part of the article by Keith Frankish Quining Diet Qualia, which asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The “classic” conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down “diet” conception will. The...
Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society July 1, 2021 Keith Frankish
The problem of consciousness arises when we depsychologize consciousness—that is, conceptualize it in terms of phenomenal feel rather than psychological function. Panpsychism offers an elegant solution to the problem, which takes depsychologization seriously. In doing so, however, it also illustrates the perils of depsychologization. Nagasawa highlights one dead end for panpsychism, and I shall...
Consciousness and Cognition June 1, 2012 Keith Frankish 47 citations
This paper asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The 'classic' conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down 'diet' conception will. I argue that this is wrong and that the diet notion of qualia has no...
Keith Frankish preprint
The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) has recently been branded pseudoscience. Its methodology is certainly anomalous, but does that make it pseudoscience or an appropriately anomalous science of an anomalous phenomenon? This article considers the question and argues that the accusation of pseudoscience has merit. At best, IIT is a metaphysical theory mispresented as science.