A Bundle of Mysteries

Phenomenal consciousness appears mysterious in several ways. Introspectively, it seems obvious and intimate, as if mental contact. It seems irreducible, distinct from brain or physical processes and impossible to explain scientifically. From a third-person perspective, it seems undetectable and not directly measurable. The chapter argues these intuitions are strong, robust, and widely shared, stemming from the concept of phenomenal consciousness itself, and notes its particular epistemological and ethical significance.

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Abstract

Abstract This chapter first defines phenomenal consciousness by appealing to introspection. It stresses that phenomenal consciousness seems mysterious: we are disposed to think that it has various mysterious peculiarities. It zeroes in on a few of these apparent mysteries. First, phenomenal consciousness seems introspectively obvious: it seems that, in introspection, our phenomenal experiences are presented to us in a remarkably intimate way, akin to a mental form of contact. Second, phenomenal consciousness seems irreducible. Phenomenal experiences seem notably distinct from brain processes, or more generally, physical processes. They seem impossible to explain scientifically. Third, phenomenal consciousness seems undetectable: from the third-person perspective, we never seem able to detect and measure it directly. The chapter argues that our intuitions that phenomenal consciousness has these mysterious properties are strong, robust, and widely shared, and that they stem from our concept of phenomenal consciousness. Finally, it notes that phenomenal consciousness also seems particularly significant from an epistemological and ethical perspective.