Behavioral and Brain Sciences
2026
Alexander Lerchner
Abstract Computation is a description sandwiched by meaning that is supplied by an external observer. This observer-dependence limits computation to a mere simulation of mind, not a realisation. I argue that this makes computational functionalism logically untenable. Consciousness, as a real phenomenon, must instead be grounded in a system with intrinsic meaning – a living, teleodynamic organism.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
2026
Nick Lane
Abstract Seth provides a nuanced but compelling case for consciousness being substrate dependent: a product of living processes rather than computation. Here, I offer a biological underpinning for these arguments grounded in the wetware of metabolism in single-celled organisms. Fluctuations in membrane potential give an integrated real-time readout of metabolic state in relation to the...
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
2026
Anil K. Seth
Abstract I was delighted, challenged, and somewhat overwhelmed by the breadth and depth of the commentaries elicited by the target article. I am very grateful to every one of my commentators for offering such thoughtful perspectives. Here, I attempt to isolate some common themes and offer some thoughts in response. One conclusion is immediately evident: it is increasingly urgent to think...
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
2026
Jakob Hohwy
Abstract Seth argues in favour of strongly substrate-dependent biological naturalism. I suggest we need more reason to believe the substrates in question are consciousness-specific. Instead, the case for mortal computational biological naturalism is more promising. A self-evidencing framing helps elucidate what the consciousness-specific functional characteristics of mortal computation might...
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
2026
Tobias Schlicht
Abstract I argue that we are not epistemically justified to judge whether the neurobiological details of computational mechanisms are relevant to consciousness or not. It is unclear how the medium independence of neural computation required for Computational Functionalism could be established. But it is also unclear whether predictive processing depends on life-sustaining biological processes...
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
2026
Gualtiero Piccinini
Abstract I argue that creature consciousness depends on specific neurobiophysical properties that constitute the medium for phenomenally conscious states. Such properties are not medium flexible in the way required by computational functionalism. Therefore, computational functionalism fails, and one of the following holds: biological naturalism, a nonbiological yet noncomputational version of...
European Journal of Prosthodontics and Restorative Dentistry
2026
Bonita Mitra, Prajna Mohapatra, Deepti Mishra et al.
This endeavor contributes to the rising trend of research in positive psychology, pointing out the influence of Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) in promoting emotional well-being among young adults. On combining mindfulness drills with a target on human potentials and virtues, the 8-week MBSR program exhibited crucial advancements in emotional well-being, comprising a 23% rise in WHO-5...
Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University Philosophy and Conflict Studies
2026
Elmira S. Lazarenko
This article examines Mahayana philosophy as an integral worldview system possessing a high transformative potential in the context of shaping the spirituality of the “new human being.” The study employs qualitative research methods, particularly focus group discussions and expert interviews conducted with practitioners and scholars from six countries: Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,...
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
2026
Ron Chrisley
Abstract Seth’s argument relies on the unargued-for claim that if computational functionalism is false, conscious AI is impossible. I show why the claim is in need of support by way of an analogy. I use a different analogy, involving artificial flight, to show that even if human consciousness is ineliminably biological, this does not imply the impossibility of non-biological, computational AI.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
2026
Henry Shevlin
Abstract Seth mounts a rich and persuasive case that human consciousness cannot be understood without life’s distinctive machinery – autopoiesis, allostatic control, predictive processing under the free-energy principle, and substrate-entangled dynamics. I agree that this undercuts the expectation that humanlike consciousness will “come for free” with more intelligent machines. However, we...