Self-evidencing and consciousness-specific mortal computation
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2026 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x25103592 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Seth's strongly substrate-dependent biological naturalism lacks sufficient grounds for treating the substrates in question as consciousness-specific, and proposes that "mortal computational biological naturalism," clarified through a self-evidencing framing, is the more promising position, leaving conscious AI "waiting in the wings." |
Abstract
Abstract Seth argues in favour of strongly substrate-dependent biological naturalism. I suggest we need more reason to believe the substrates in question are consciousness-specific. Instead, the case for mortal computational biological naturalism is more promising. A self-evidencing framing helps elucidate what the consciousness-specific functional characteristics of mortal computation might be, leaving conscious AI waiting in the wings.