Consciousness as a natural kind and the methodological puzzle of consciousness
Mind & Language April 7, 2022 DOI: 10.1111/mila.12413 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 46 |
| Key points | Argues that conceiving of consciousness as a natural kind cannot distinguish consciousness from cognitive access, because there may be episodes of conscious experience that have not been classified as such. This raises a novel problem for the proposed approach. |
Abstract
A new research programme conceives of consciousness as a natural kind. One proposed virtue of this approach is that it can help resolve the methodological puzzle of consciousness, which involves distinguishing consciousness from cognitive access. The present article raises a novel problem for this approach. The problem is rooted in the fact that there may be episodes of conscious experience that have not been classified as such. I argue that conceiving of consciousness as a natural kind cannot distinguish consciousness from cognitive access.
Citations in the library
Cited by 2
Cites 10
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- The methodological puzzle of phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018
- Methodological Encounters with the Phenomenal Kind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research March 1, 2012
and 5 more in the library